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Abstract 
During the 1860s, no one nation a t t r a c t e d as much 
a t t e n t i o n from the B r i t i s h than the United States of 
America as the American C i v i l War proved t o be one of 
the most d i v i s i v e t o p i c s i n Great B r i t a i n . I n one 
p a r t i c u l a r forum - the B r i t i s h Parliament - the 
div i s i v e n e s s concerning the war was c l e a r l y evident. 
This t h e s i s examines the parliamentary debates on 
the n e u t r a l i t y p o l i c y from 1861 t o 1863. I n the 
debates, both the i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s and the n e u t r a l i s t s 
e x p l o i t e d numerous issues i n t h e i r attempts t o persuade 
t h e i r f e l l o w members t o support i n t e r v e n t i o n or 
n e u t r a l i t y . The issues include the blockade, the 
cott o n shortage, slavery, s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , and the 
fear of war w i t h the United States i f i n t e r v e n t i o n 
occurred. 
Previous studies of Anglo-American r e l a t i o n s have 
concluded t h a t cotton was the major reason f o r 
i n t e r v e n t i o n while slavery was the major reason f o r 
n e u t r a l i t y . This t h e s i s contends t h a t slavery and 
cott o n were not the most common reasons f o r but simply 
two of many issues which were discussed. 
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Introduction 
" I s a i d on a former occasion t h a t i t was desirable 
t h a t i n the House we should not only pass laws and vote 
Estimates, but [we] should also be the organs and 
f e e l i n g s of large masses of the community," Palmerston 
once commented i n reference t o Parliament's r o l e as a 
forum f o r p u b l i c o p i n i o n . ^ Indeed, the aroused p u b l i c 
opinion concerning the American C i v i l War was r e f l e c t e d 
i n the Parliamentary debates. 
However, despite the passage of the Great Reform 
Act over two decades before, the m a j o r i t y of those 
Members of Parliament who were elected i n the 1859 
e l e c t i o n were from the upper class and the ar i s t o c r a c y , 
and thus they were not representative of the B r i t i s h 
p u b l i c . ^ Furthermore, t h e i r a t t i t u d e s towards the 
American C i v i l War were not representative of B r i t i s h 
p u b l i c opinion, as a m a j o r i t y of the Members of 
Parliament tended t o support the South.^ Yet 
Parliament never sanctioned a a l t e r n a t i o n i n the 
n e u t r a l i t y p o l i c y although the i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s 
desperately attempted time and time again t o convince 
^. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 165, 1862, 
D.389. 
^. E.J. Evans, The Great Reform Act (London: Methuen 
and Company, 1983), pp. 37-41; Michael Bentley, 
Politics without Democracy (Oxford: B a s i l Blackwell, 
1984), p. 94. 
. Mu r i e l Chamberlain, Lord Palmerston (London: 
Longmans, Green, and Company, 1987), p. 114; Donald 
Southgate, The Most English Minister (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1966), p. 258. 
t h e i r f e l l o w members t h a t B r i t a i n should intervene on 
behalf of the South. 
The Parliamentary debates which r e s u l t e d from the 
attacks on the n e u t r a l i t y p o l i c y reveal the most common 
issues which the i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s and n e u t r a l i s t s 
b e l i e v e d were the most persuasive f o r t h e i r 
perspective. I n the process, the debates answer the 
question of why the Members of Parliament decided t h a t 
B r i t a i n should not intervene. 
The answers t o t h i s question d i f f e r from those 
answers provided by former studies, none of which have 
s y s t e m a t i c a l l y studied Parliament. During the f i r s t 
two years of the war, the members concentrated on the 
eff e c t i v e n e s s of the Union's naval blockade of the 
Confederacy, r a t h e r than on more general issues such as 
slavery and co t t o n . Furthermore, the issue of the 
cott o n shortage, which has been o f t e n considered as the 
most common argument i n favour of i n t e r v e n t i o n , was 
never an e s p e c i a l l y popular issue w i t h the 
i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s . I t s persuasiveness i n favour of 
i n t e r v e n t i o n was mainly undercut by the un c e r t a i n t y of 
p u b l i c o p i nion. Instead, the r i g h t of s e l f -
determination was one of the most common reasons argued 
f o r i n t e r v e n t i o n i n 1862 and 1863. 
Slavery, which has been considered a popular 
reason i n favour of n e u t r a l i t y , never dominated the 
n e u t r a l i s t s ' speeches as i t remained a contentious 
issue even a f t e r the issuance of the Emancipation 
Proclamation. While a n t i s l a v e r y sentiment was strong 
i n B r i t a i n and i n Parliament, the b e l i e f t h a t the North 
was f i g h t i n g against slavery was not. Instead, concern 
f o r B r i t a i n ' s n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y - both i n terms of a 
possible war w i t h the United States and i n terms of 
Napoleon I I I - proved t o be a powerful argument f o r the 
c o n t i n u a t i o n of n e u t r a l i t y . 
I . Parliament, the Cabinet, and Neutrality 
They were f i n a l l y u n i t e d . I n 1859, B r i t a i n 
witnessed the triumph of a new p o l i t i c a l p a rty as 
Whigs, P e e l i t e s , and Radicals amalgamated t o form the 
L i b e r a l p a r t y . As some of the Members of Parliament 
cheered the beginning of a new era, few of them 
r e a l i z e d t h a t over the next four years, the most 
d i v i s i v e f o r e i g n p o l i c y issue t h a t they would debate 
would be a war t h a t would be fought over 3,000 miles 
away. 
The United States, one year l a t e r , also witnessed 
the triumph of a young p o l i t i c a l p a r t y : the Republican 
p a r t y . I t was an amalgamation of those who had been 
members of the Whig, Free S o i l , and Democratic party 
who were brought together mainly out of opposition t o 
the extension of slavery. As P.A. Taylor, M.P., l a t e r 
described the r e s u l t : 
They (the North) would not allow the action 
of slavery t o be extended over a l l the States 
of America and i n t o the new t e r r i t o r i e s . The 
South demanded t h i s , and the answer was the 
e l e c t i o n of o l d Abraham Lincoln, rugged, 
simple, and indomitable, whose name would 
l i v e a f t e r t h a t of many a smooth and polished 
statesman was f o r g o t t e n . ^ 
Indeed, the North answered, and the South seceded. 
As the Americans prepared t o bear arms against 
each other, the B r i t i s h looked across the ocean i n deep 
concern and anxiety. Many of them believed i n a 
s p e c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Americans and they wished 
t h a t American blood would not be s p i l t i n a c i v i l war. 
In the Parliamentary debates, these f e e l i n g s were 
c l e a r . Admiral Milnes and the S i r H.S. Keating, the 
S o l i c i t o r General, i n a debate of March, 1862, both 
contended t h a t there was a sense of brotherhood between 
B r i t a i n and America. Milnes asserted t h a t he had 
"always regarded a d i s r u p t i o n of the American Union as 
a great calamity f o r the world, b e l i e v i n g , w i t h De 
Tocqueville, t h a t i t would do more t o destroy p o l i t i c a l 
l i b e r t y and a r r e s t the progress of mankind than any 
other event t h a t can be possibly imagined." The 
Admiral believed t h a t the "Americans are our f e l l o w -
countrymen; I s h a l l always c a l l them so; I see i n them 
our own character, reproduced w i t h a l l i t s merits and 
a l l i t s defects" and he could "never, f o r a moment, 
disassociate the fortunes of Great B r i t a i n from the 
fortunes of the United States of America." The 
S o l i c i t o r General s t a t e d i n reference t o Americans: 
"They are men of the same blood, language, and 
Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 168, 1862, 
p.572. 
r e l i g i o n , the c h i l d r e n of our f o r e f a t h e r s , who are 
u n i t e d t o us by a l l the bonds t h a t u n i t e man and man 
together. 
With the e r u p t i o n of h o s t i l i t i e s , people on both 
sides of the A t l a n t i c anxiously waited f o r news as t o 
whether B r i t a i n would support the North or the South. 
Through t h e i r questions t o the M i n i s t r y , the Members of 
Parliament sought t o discover the answer. 
On A p r i l 29, 1861, j u s t two weeks a f t e r President 
L i n c o l n had c a l l e d f o r troops, the f i r s t of many 
debates on the American c i v i l war commenced i n the 
Houses of Parliament. The E a r l of Malmesbury i n the 
House of Lords rose t o speak i n favour of o b t a i n i n g 
"assistance i n seeking t o put a stop at the outset t o a 
c i v i l war" and he f u r t h e r questioned whether Her 
Majesty's Government had "made any attempt t o prevent 
the q u a r r e l between the d i f f e r e n t States of the 
American Union from coming t o a bloody issue."^ Lord 
Worehouse, speaking f o r the Government, answered, 
"However great the i n t e r e s t which we may f e e l i n the 
welfare of her people, and however anxious we might be 
t o rescue them from the misfortune which appears t o be 
impending over t h e i r heads, we yet thought t h a t a great 
and independent n a t i o n might not welcome advice given 
2, Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 165, 
Dp.1204, 1224. 
^. The assistance t o which he r e f e r r e d would have been, 
most l i k e l y , a concert of European nations urging the 
Americans t o avoid a d i v i s i v e and d e s t r u c t i v e war. 
w i t h respect t o her i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s , i f t h a t advice 
were p r o f f e r e d without being s o l i c i t e d . " ^ 
On May 2, 1861, almost three weeks a f t e r the f a l l 
of Fort Sumter, Lord John Russell, the Foreign M i n i s t e r 
i n Viscount Palmerston's Cabinet, gave the f i r s t 
i n d i c a t i o n of the p o l i c y which would d i r e c t B r i t a i n i n 
her r e l a t i o n s w i t h the United States and the 
Confederate States. I n answering a question concerning 
the ominous American c r i s i s , the statesman i n s i s t e d , 
"We have not been involved i n any way i n t h a t contest 
by any act or g i v i n g any advice i n the matter, and, f o r 
God's sake, l e t us i f possible keep out of i t ! " ^ 
Beginning on May 6 and l a s t i n g u n t i l the f o l l o w i n g 
week, the Members of Parliament, both Northern and 
Southern sympathisers, continued t o press t h e i r 
government f o r a proclamation concerning B r i t a i n ' s 
approach t o the American C i v i l War. On May 9, Mr. 
Forste r , r e a l i z i n g the danger t o B r i t i s h seaman who 
might become involved i n the war, ra i s e d the concern 
t h a t Her Majesty's Subjects may p a r t i c i p a t e on 
p r i v a t e e r s . S i r George Lewis announced t h a t a 
proclamation concerning B r i t a i n and the American war 
was i n the works. Then, the f o l l o w i n g day, the Ea r l of 
Derby r a i s e d the question of the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of 
B r i t i s h seaman and also asked whether both the North 
and the South were t o be considered b e l l i g e r e n t s . Like 
^. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 162, 1861, 
g.1280. 
I b i d , p.1377. 
Lewis before him. E a r l G r a n v i l l e answered t h a t a 
proclamation was being prepared by the government.^ 
In the end, B r i t a i n supported n e i t h e r side. The 
proclamation, which was issued on May 13, determined 
t h a t both the United States and the Confederate States 
would be considered b e l l i g e r e n t s while Great B r i t a i n 
would adhere t o a p o l i c y of n e u t r a l i t y towards both 
p a r t i e s . This was a disappointment f o r the North who 
considered the Confederates rebels, not b e l l i g e r e n t s . 
For the South, t h i s was only a p a r t i a l v i c t o r y as the 
proclamation f a i l e d t o grant the Confederacy 
r e c o g n i t i o n as an independent s t a t e . 
The c r i t i c a l d ecision was made by the Cabinet, 
which, i n the B r i t i s h s t r u c t u r e of government, 
t y p i c a l l y determined matters of f o r e i g n p o l i c y ; 
Parliament more o f t e n dealt w i t h matters of domestic 
l e g i s l a t i o n . Palmerston c l e a r l y believed i n the merits 
of the status quo as he had no desire t o have f o r e i g n 
p o l i c y guided by d i r e c t Parliamentary r e s o l u t i o n s . In 
response t o a motion by the i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s , 
Palmerston i n s i s t e d t h a t they should "leave the matter 
of such d i f f i c u l t y i n the hands of responsible 
Government" f o r he wanted the House t o "leave i t t o the 
d i s c r e t i o n of the Government. ""^  However, the Cabinet 
and i t s p o l i c i e s could survive only w i t h the support of 
^. I b i d , pp. 1763, 1830. Lord Derby, the leader of the 
Conservative Party, was, l i k e D i s r a e l i , a n e u t r a l i s t . 
John Vincent, The Formation of the Liberal Party, 
(London: Constable and Company, 1966) p.75. 
Hansard' s Parliamentary Debates, Volume 168, pp.570 
-573. 
the Members of Parliament. Parliament d i d have the 
power t o embarrass or overthrow the Cabinet, even on 
questions of f o r e i g n p o l i c y , and i t was p r e c i s e l y t h a t 
power which the i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s wanted t o harness. 
Those Members of Parliament who supported the 
South most a r d e n t l y then set upon a crusade i n order t o 
force the B r i t i s h Government t o intervene on terms 
favourable t o the Confederacy. The forms of 
i n t e r v e n t i o n which the i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s advocated 
included o f f e r i n g mediation, recognising the 
Confederacy as an independent nation, or f o r c i b l e 
i n t e r v e n t i o n such as l i f t i n g the blockade. 
Those Members who most vehemently opposed 
n e u t r a l i t y held a strong passion f o r the South and were 
u s u a l l y members of the Conservative p a r t y . These 
included such members as Lord Campbell, Lord Robert 
C e c i l , and Wi l l i a m Lindsay. S i r William Gregory, 
although not a member of the Conservative pa r t y , was 
also a passionate Southern sympathiser. A l l four of 
•James 
these men became f r i e n d s of John Mason, the Confederate 
emissary i n London, and a l l j o i n e d the Southern 
Independence Association, an organisation established 
i n B r i t a i n f o r the sole purpose of augmenting support 
f o r the Confederacy. Gregory's Southern sympathies 
were e s p e c i a l l y strong due t o hi s v i s i t t o the South 
before the war. As one notable Northern sympathiser 
wrote: "A Mr. Gregory, M.P. f o r Galway, who l a t e l y 
t r a v e l l e d i n the South...has returned w e l l humbugged by 
10 
the Southerners."^ Indeed, Gregory's passion would 
lead him t o attack the n e u t r a l i t y p o l i c y and support 
the South more o f t e n than any other member. 
The most outspoken supporters of n e u t r a l i t y were 
mostly members of the f a c t i o n known as the Radicals, 
who supported n e u t r a l i t y due t o t h e i r Northern 
sympathies. John B r i g h t , W i l l i a m E. Forster and P.A. 
Taylor were representatives of t h i s persuasion who 
bel i e v e d t h a t Lincoln was against slavery. Taylor 
became one of the founding members of the Emancipation 
Society which was founded i n 1862 i n response t o the 
pro-southern organizations. The hatred of slavery was 
e s p e c i a l l y personal t o Forster f o r h i s f a t h e r , a Quaker 
m i n i s t e r , d i e d i n Tennessee i n 1852 while on a crusade 
against slavery. Proudly c a r r y i n g on h i s father's 
cause, Forster would speak i n favour of n e u t r a l i t y and 
the United States more than even B r i g h t during the 
f i r s t two years of the c i v i l war.^ 
The attacks on the n e u t r a l i t y p o l i c y by the 
i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s came at a few concentrated moments 
during the course of the war. I n the f i r s t year - 1861 
- there was r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e discussion, e s p e c i a l l y 
when compared t o the f o l l o w i n g years. Most of the MP's 
^. Quoted i n T.Wemyss Reid, The Life of W.E. Forster 
(London: Chapman and H a l l , 1888), pp.333, 338. 
Bet t y Fladeland, Abolitionists and Working-Class 
Problems in the Age of Industrialization (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1984), p. 393; Howard 
Temperley, British Antislavery, 1833-1870 (London: 
Longman, Green, and Company, 1972), p. 253. 
11 
be l i e v e d t h a t the war would end i n nin e t y days and thus 
debated the n e u t r a l i t y p o l i c y i n f r e q u e n t l y . 
The discussion on May 28 provided the f i r s t 
i n d i c a t i o n t h a t some of the Members were passionate 
Southern sympathizers. For on t h a t day, Gregory 
announced t h a t he would b r i n g forward a motion f o r the 
r e c o g n i t i o n of the Confederacy as an independent nation 
on June 7. This motion was h i g h l y unusual f o r Gregory 
was attempting t o make f o r e i g n p o l i c y against the 
wishes of the Prime M i n i s t e r . Russell d i d not d i r e c t l y 
respond t o Gregory's warning, he only concluded by 
saying t h a t he hoped t o c o n f l i c t would be a short one 
which would not i n t e r f e r e w i t h the p r o s p e r i t y of the 
country. •'•^  
On June 6 i n the House of Commons, Mr. Crawford 
asked whether Gregory's motion f o r Southern r e c o g n i t i o n 
would be on the t a b l e tomorrow and whether the Foreign 
Secretary deemed i t desirable t h a t the subject should 
be debated. Gregory responded d e f i a n t l y t h a t he d i d 
in t e n d t o b r i n g the motion forward tomorrow and he 
bel i e v e d t h a t the Foreign Secretary was prepared t o 
answer the question. Russell warned Gregory, " I cannot 
say t h a t I t h i n k i t i s desirable t h a t i t should come 
on." The Foreign Secretary w e l l knew the divisiveness 
and the passion which would be unleashed i f the motion 
was discussed. 
Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 163, p.188. 
11. I b i d , p. 631. 
12 
On June 7, the members gathered f o r what was 
expected t o be an intense debate. Colonel Wilson 
Patten rose t o i n q u i r e whether Gregory's motion, "To 
c a l l the a t t e n t i o n of the House t o the expediency of 
the prompt r e c o g n i t i o n of the Southern Confederacy of 
America," could be postponed. Gregory, t o the r e l i e f 
of some and t o the consternation of others, agreed. 
A f t e r two other MP's had spoken, Mr. Monckton Milnes 
then questioned whether Mr. Forster would b r i n g forward 
h i s counter motion "To c a l l the a t t e n t i o n of the House 
t o the inexpediency of i n t e r f e r i n g i n behalf of those 
c i t i z e n s of the United States who are now i n 
i n s u r r e c t i o n against t h e i r Government, by a rec o g n i t i o n 
of the Confederacy which they have formed." Mr. 
Forste r , l i k e Gregory before him, declined t o b r i n g 
forward h i s motion because he believed t h a t " i t was 
most undesirable there should be a discussion on the 
merits of the q u a r r e l between the States of America."^^ 
The debate had been averted. Forster's l e t t e r 
sheds more l i g h t on the r e s u l t as he wrote t h a t Gregory 
" i n s i s t s upon proposing t o the House the absurd but 
mischievious n o t i o n t h a t we should promptly recognize 
J e f f e r s o n Davis's Confederacy. I have met h i s noti c e 
of motion w i t h corresponding counter-notice, and 
expected the debate t o come o f f a week or two ago; but 
^2. Quoted i n T.Wemyss Reid, p.333. Betty Fladeland 
concluded t h a t "William E. Forster's motion against 
Gregory was a st r a t e g y developed by the B r i t i s h and 
Foreign Anti-Slavery Society." Betty Fladeland, 
Abolitionists and Working Class Problems in the Age of 
Industrialization (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1984), p.388. 
13 
a t t h e p r e s s i n g s o l i c i t a t i o n o f t h e Government he p u t 
i t o f f . Most men o f i n f l u e n c e i n P a r l i a m e n t wish him 
not t o p e r s i s t i n b r i n g i n g i t f o r w a r d , b u t he t a l k s o f 
d o i n g so I w i s h i t had f a l l e n i n t o t h e hands o f a 
member o f more exp e r i e n c e t o s t a n d up f o r t h e N o r t h and 
t h e Union; b u t I must do what I can." The Members o f 
P a r l i a m e n t , l i k e most Americans, b e l i e v e d i n June, 1861 
t h a t t h e war would end w i t h i n a few months and thus saw 
no reason t o b e g i n a debate on such a d i v i s i v e t o p i c . 
T h e i r h e s i t a t i o n would l a s t u n t i l t h e f o l l o w i n g year.^^ 
Between t h e two p a r l i a m e n t a r y s e s s i o n s , r e l a t i o n s 
between B r i t a i n and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s d e t e r i o r a t e d t o a 
n a d i r due t o t h e T r e n t c r i s i s . The s i t u a t i o n was 
e n t i r e l y h a n d l e d by t h e Cabinet, and s i n c e P a r l i a m e n t 
was not i n s e s s i o n t h e r e were few subsequent r e f e r e n c e s 
on t h e c r i s i s . H o w e v e r , one o f t h e most n o t a b l e 
d i s c u s s i o n s o f t h e c r i s i s i n P a r l i a m e n t i n v o l v e d a 
Member o f P a r l i a m e n t c o m p l i m e n t i n g b o t h B r i t a i n and t h e 
U n i t e d S t a t e s f o r t h e i r conduct. A d m i r a l W a l c o t t 
s t a t e d t h a t "Both c o u n t r i e s had done w e l l : England was 
f i r m and r e s o l u t e ; America d i d j u s t i c e , though t a r d i l y , 
and such a peace was o f t h e n a t u r e o f a conquest when 
'both p a r t i e s n o b l y are subdued; and n e i t h e r p a r t y 
l o s e r . ' " ^ 5 
Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 165, p.759. 
. A s p e c i a l war counse l , assembled on December 9, 
1861, had recommended t o Palmerston t h a t i n case of war 
w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s B r i t a i n s h o u l d r a i d Union 
s h i p p i n g , break t h e Union blockade o f t h e South, and 
impose a c o u n t e r b l o c k a d e on t h e N o r t h . Norman B. 
F e r r i s , The Trent Affair: A Diplomatic Crisis, 
i K n o x v i l l e , 1977), p.65. 
Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 165, p.92. 
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D u r i n g February and March, 1862 numerous members 
such as Benjamin D i s r a e l i , Gregory, t h e E a r l o f 
Malmesbury, and Mr. Peacocke r e q u e s t e d i n f o r m a t i o n on 
t h e blockade's e f f e c t i v e n e s s . The p r e s s u r e c o n t i n u e d 
as Lord Robert C e c i l p o i n t e d l y asked, "How soon t h e 
Papers which have been promised upon t h e s u b j e c t of t h e 
American blockade are l i k e l y t o be l a i d upon t h e 
t a b l e ? " Layard c o u l d o n l y respond t h a t he "hoped t h e y 
would be l a i d on t h e t a b l e by t h e end of t h e week." On 
February 20, D a n i e l O'Donoghue, an I r i s h MP, w h i l e 
d e f e n d i n g t h e blockade a l s o wished t o know t h e number 
of v e s s e l s which had broken i t . ^ ^ 
On March 7, one o f t h e g r e a t e s t debates on t h e 
American war e r u p t e d i n t h e House o f Commons. The 
f i g u r e s on t h e blockade's e f f e c t i v e n e s s had been 
r e l e a s e d and t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s wanted t o make t h e 
most o f them. T h i s debate r e p r e s e n t e d t h e f i r s t 
e x t e n s i v e d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e American C i v i l War and as 
such, p r o v i d e d t h e f i r s t i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e d i v i s i v e n e s s 
i n P a r l i a m e n t and t h e c o n f u s i n g n a t u r e of t h e war. The 
i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s were p r e s s i n g f o r B r i t a i n t o o f f e r 
m e d i a t i o n t o t h e N o r t h and South, t h e hope b e i n g t h a t 
i f t h e o f f e r was accepted by b o t h s i d e s , t h e war c o u l d 
be ended w i t h t h e South e s t a b l i s h e d as a f r e e and 
. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 165, pp.66, 
435, 526. A l t h o u g h a n e u t r a l i s t , D i s r a e l i was a l s o a 
s o u t h e r n s y m p a t h i s e r . As he wrote on Decemeber 8, 1861: 
"What wondrous t i m e s are t h e s e ! Who c o u l d have supposed 
t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s o f America would be t h e scene of 
an immense r e v o l u t i o n . . . They [ t h e events i n America] 
must, however, t e l l immensely i n f a v o u r o f 
a r i s t o c r a c y . " Quoted from Robert Blake, Disraeli 
(London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1966), p.419. 
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independent nation. Even i f the North refused the 
o f f e r , the i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s then hoped that B r i t a i n 
would recognise the South and thus i n c r e a s e the chances 
that the Confederacy would endure. However, the 
attempt f a i l e d . The Southern sympthisers were unable 
to convince a majority of the members that i n t e r v e n t i o n 
was more prudent than n e u t r a l i t y . As John Bright 
recorded i n h i s d i a r y that evening, the "South gained 
nothing by the discussion."^'' 
From the middle of March u n t i l the end of the 
s e s s i o n . Lord Campbell and Hopwood continued to attack 
and question the n e u t r a l i t y p o l i c y as R u s s e l l and 
Palmerston defended t h e i r p o l i c y . However, the great 
antagoniser would be Lindsay whose motion would spark 
another intense debate. On June 20, he announced h i s 
i n t e n t i o n to introduce a r e s o l u t i o n to recognize the 
Southern S t a t e s of America. He agreed to postpone h i s 
motion u n t i l J u l y 11, although he added that "before 
long those s t a t e s must become an independent nation."^^ 
As Lindsay was pushing for recognition, Lee was 
desp e r a t e l y defending the Confederate c a p i t a l . In 
June, General George B. McClellan had launched the Army 
of the Potomac against General Robert E. Lee and the 
Army of Northern V i r g i n i a . In the midst of t h i s 
s t r u g g l e . Lord Brougham, i n the House of Lords, twice 
appealed to the Americans to make peace by i n s i s t i n g 
t h a t while "the war might be explained, i t could not be 
1''. R.A.J. Walling, ed.. The Diaries of John Bright 
(London: C a s s e l l and Company, 1930), p. 255. 
Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 167, p.810. 
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j u s t i f i e d or even extenuated" and "could h i s voice 
reach them, he would, as a f r i e n d , a fellow C h r i s t i a n , 
a f e l l o w c r e a t u r e , implore them to make an end of t h i s 
h o r r i b l e war." On the f i r s t day of July, he hoped that 
" t h i s bloody and f r a t r i c i d a l war would soon be brought 
to a termination." He u t t e r e d these words on the day 
that the Seven Days B a t t l e ended with Richmond safe, 
McClellan r e t r e a t i n g , and America having s u f f e r e d 
30,000 more c a s u a l t i e s . 
Two weeks l a t e r , on J u l y 18, Lindsay's motion on 
behalf of the Confederacy was expected to be discussed. 
Even members of the government were beginning to take 
the idea of some form of diplomatic i n t e r v e n t i o n 
s e r i o u s l y . On that very day Gladstone had "Pressed Ld 
P. to say nothing agt [ s i c ] an o f f e r of mediation" i n 
hoping that Lindsay would p r e v a i l . However, Mr. Clay 
"requested that Mr. Lindsay not bri n g forward that 
evening the Motion which stood i n h i s name." He 
supported t h i s request by noting the " s p e c i a l grounds 
which he ventured to make h i s appeal to h i s hon. Fr i e n d 
were the currency of a rumour as to a success of the 
Confederates over General McClellan and h i s army." 
J.C. Ewort q u i c k l y seconded the motion to adjourn. 
S c u l l y and S i r Robert Peel concurred. Lindsay 
harboured no wish to postpone the motion but, i n the 
end, he had no choice. 
19. I b i d , pp. 1201, 1284. 
20. I b i d , pp.503 - 504. Gladstone quote from H.C.G, 
Matthew, ed., Gladstone diaries (Oxford: Clarendon 
P r e s s , 1978), Volume 6, p. 136. 
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L a t e r t h a t same day Lindsay h u r l e d t h e Commons 
i n t o an i n t e n s e debate on t h e war i n America. He 
proposed "That i n t h e o p i n i o n o f t h i s House, t h e States 
which have seceded from t h e Union o f t h e Republic of 
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , have so l o n g .maintained themselves 
under a s p e c i f i c and e s t a b l i s h e d Government, and have 
g i v e n such p r o o f o f t h e i r d e t e r m i n a t i o n and a b i l i t y t o 
sup p o r t t h e i r Independence, t h a t t h e p r o s p e r i t y o f 
o f f e r i n g m e d i a t i o n , w i t h t h e view o f t e r m i n a t i n g 
h o s t i l i t i e s between t h e c o n t e n d i n g p a r t i e s , i s worthy 
of t h e s e r i o u s and immediate a t t e n t i o n o f Her Majesty's 
Government. "^ -^  
D e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t f i v e members spoke i n fa v o u r 
of t h e mot i o n - Lindsay, Vane Tempest, Wh i t e s i d e , 
Gregory, and F i t z g e r a l d - t h e motion had t o be 
withdra w n due t o l a c k o f s u p p o r t . The speeches by 
T a y l o r , F o r s t e r , and e s p e c i a l l y Palmerston convinced 
t h e MP's t o c o n t i n u e on a n e u t r a l course. But, i n 
r e f e r e n c e t o t h e debate on Lindsay's motion, Palmerston 
i n f o r m e d Queen V i c t o r i a t h a t " I t was indeed m a n i f e s t 
t h a t t h e f e e l i n g o f t h e m a j o r i t y o f t h e House i s 
d e c i d e d l y i n f a v o u r o f t h e South, on t h e ground t h a t 
t h e y are now f i g h t i n g f o r t h e i r independence on t h e 
v e r y same p r i n c i p l e s on which b o t h N o r t h and South 
a c t e d i n t h e i r s e p a r a t i o n from England."*^ 
21. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 168, p.511. 
22. Quoted from B r i a n C o n n e l l , ed., Regina v. 
Palmerston: The Correspondence between Queen Victoria 
and Her Foreign and Prime Minister, 1837-1865 (London: 
Evans B r o t h e r s , 1962), p.329. 
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This was t h e l a s t o c c a s i o n d u r i n g t h e 1862 session 
of P a r l i a m e n t i n e i t h e r o f t h e Houses when t h e 
i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s p r e s s e d t o pressed f o r any a l t e r a t i o n 
i n t h e n e u t r a l i t y p o l i c y . N e v e r t h e l e s s , d u r i n g t h e 
i n t e r i m between t h e 1862 and 1863 sessions as Lee 
inv a d e d Maryland, t h e Cabinet began t o c o n s i d e r some 
form o f i n t e r v e n t i o n . The i n i t i a t i v e came from t h e 
C h a n c e l l o r o f t h e Exchequer W i l l i a m E. Gladstone, who 
s t r o n g l y advocated m e d i a t i o n and he a c q u i r e d some 
sup p o r t even from R u s s e l l and Palmerston b u t , i n 
November, t h e m a j o r i t y o f t h e Cabinet r e f u s e d t o a l t e r 
p o l i c y . T h i s d e c i s i o n occured a f t e r t h e B a t t l e o f 
A n t i e t a m and t h e issuance o f t h e Emancipation 
P r o c l a m a t i o n . 
For t h e f i r s t few weeks o f t h e 1863 ses s i o n , t h r e e 
d i s c u s s i o n s o c c u r r e d c o n c e r n i n g t h e n e u t r a l i t y p o l i c y . 
Two o f these would i n v o l v e Mr. B e n t i c k and Mr. Hopwood 
d i r e c t i n g q u e s t i o n s t o t h e Prime M i n i s t e r . I n b o t h 
cases, Palmerston answered t h e i r q u e s t i o n s w i t h 
b r e v i t y . Towards t h e end o f March, R u s s e l l would have 
t o respond t o s e v e r a l p o i n t s as Lord Campbell would 
d e l i v e r a mammoth speech p r e s s i n g f o r t h e t e r m i n a t i o n 
o f t h e n e u t r a l i t y p o l i c y . And on June 29, R i c h a r d 
Cobden would c o u n t e r one o f Lord Campbell's a t t a c k on 
th e b l o c k a d e . So, o v e r a l l , t h e f i r s t months o f t h e 
1863 s e s s i o n ended w i t h o n l y two major debates on 
n e u t r a l i t y . Yet, a t t h e end o f t h e 1863 session, 
P a r l i a m e n t would e x p e r i e n c e one l a s t debate on t h e 
n e u t r a l i t y p o l i c y . 
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As June p r o g r e s s e d t h r e e storms g a t h e r e d which 
would a l t e r t h e course o f t h e American war. I n t h e 
West, Grant s t u b b o r n l y besieged V i c k s b u r g as t h e 
Confederates s t a u n c h l y r e f u s e d t o s u r r e n d e r . I n the 
East, Lee was ready t o l e a d h i s army n o r t h f o r t h e i r 
second i n v a s i o n . And i n B r i t a i n , t h e pugnacious 
Roebuck, t h e Member f o r S h e f f i e l d , p r e p a r e d t o l e a d one 
o f t h e g r e a t e s t a t t a c k s upon t h e n e u t r a l i t y p o l i c y . I n 
these t h r e e realms, s u p p o r t e r s o f N o r t h and South 
p e n s i v e l y p r e p a r e d f o r b a t t l e . From t h e trenches along 
t h e M i s s i s s i p p i , t o t h e s m a l l h i l l s o f Southern 
P e n n s y l v a n i a , t o t h e benches o f Westminster, t h e f u t u r e 
o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s l a y a t s t a k e . 
On June 27, O'Donoghue asked whether Roebuck was 
i n t e n d i n g t o proceed w i t h h i s "Motion f o r t h e 
r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e Confederate S t a t e s o f America. 
Roebuck adamantly r e p l i e d , "My answer. S i r , i s 
c e r t a i n l y ; and I am o n l y a s t o n i s h e d t h a t t h e r e should 
be any doubt upon t h e m a t t e r . " The House o f Commons 
was headed f o r a showdown. On t h e f o l l o w i n g days, b o t h 
L o r d Campbell and F o r s t e r asked about Anglo-French 
communication c o n c e r n i n g p o s s i b l e i n t e r v e n t i o n . The 
p e r s i s t e n c e on t h e p a r t o f these Members was not 
w i t h o u t b a s i s , f o r Roebuck, t o g e t h e r w i t h Lindsay, t h e 
Member f o r Sunderland, had r e c e n t l y r e t u r n e d from P a r i s 
a f t e r an audience w i t h t h e Emperor c o n c e r n i n g t h e 
q u e s t i o n o f Southern r e c o g n i t i o n . I n f o r m a t i o n on these 
20 
rumours would be made p u b l i c on June 30 as P a r l i a m e n t 
w i t n e s s e d t h e g r e a t debate on t h e n e u t r a l i t y p o l i c y . 2 3 
To u n d e r s t a n d t h e f u l l impact o f Roebuck's speech, 
two p o i n t s must be c o n s i d e r e d . F i r s t o f a l l , two 
former m i n i s t r i e s had r e s i g n e d due t o p r e v i o u s Roebuck 
mo t i o n s . I n one case t h e m i n i s t r y r e s i g n e d a f t e r 
o pposing one o f h i s motions w h i l e another r e s i g n e d 
a f t e r a c c e p t i n g one. I t has been s p e c u l a t e d t h a t t h i s 
m o t i o n was i n t e n d e d t o b r i n g down Palmerston's Cabinet. 
Secondly, Roebuck was w e l l known f o r h i s r a t h e r f r a n k 
p e r s o n a l i t y . This was b e s t d e s c r i b e d i n t h e words of 
one o f h i s c o n s t i t u e n t s : 
Roebuck i s always s a y i n g something which i s 
l y i n g a t t h e bottom o f o t h e r people's minds, 
b u t which o t h e r people do not say. They keep 
i t f o r e x a m i n a t i o n and m o d i f i c a t i o n b e f o r e i t 
i s a l l o w e d t o come i n t o f r e e t h o u g h t or open 
words. Roebuck d i g s i t up, and p u t s i t 
b e f o r e us, and makes us l o o k i t f u l l i n t h e 
face a t once. Sometimes we do not thank him 
f o r t h e o f f i c e . 2 4 
Roebuck commenced h i s l o n g speech by s t a t i n g , " I 
now appeal t o t h e House - t o i t s honour and d u t y - t o 
ask t h e Crown t o e n t e r i n t o n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h t h e g r e a t 
23. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 171, 
D,1527. 
24. Robert Leader, ed.. The Life of John Arthur 
Roebuck, (London: Edward A r n o l d , 1896), p.300. 
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Powers f o r t h e purpose o f acknowledging t h e 
independence o f t h e Southern S t a t e s of N o r t h America." 
A f t e r a speech o f g r e a t l e n g t h which i n c l u d e d numerous 
reasons t o r e c o g n i z e t h e South, he concluded w i t h the 
m o t i o n "That an humble Address be p r e s e n t e d t o Her 
M a j e s t y , p r a y i n g t h a t She w i l l be g r a c i o u s l y pleased t o 
e n t e r i n t o n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h t h e Great Powers o f 
Europe, f o r t h e purpose o f o b t a i n i n g t h e i r c o o p e r a t i o n 
i n t h e r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e independence o f t h e 
Confederate S t a t e s of N o r t h America."^^ 
The l a c k o f s u p p o r t f o r Roebuck's motion i s 
c l e a r l y e x e m p l i f i e d by t h e f a c t t h a t t h e next f o u r 
speakers a l l opposed i t . Montagu f o l l o w e d Roebuck w i t h 
a c r i t i c a l speech which c l o s e d w i t h t h e amendment "To 
l e a v e out from t h e word "That" t o t h e end of t h e 
Q u e s t i o n , i n o r d e r t o add t h e words ' t h i s House 
e a r n e s t l y d e s i r e s t h a t an i m p a r t i a l n e u t r a l i t y should 
c o n t i n u e t o be m a i n t a i n e d by Her Majesty's Government 
d u r i n g t h e p r e s e n t unhappy c o n t e s t i n t h e S t a t e s o f 
N o r t h America."^^ C l i f f o r d t h e n rose t o speak and, 
d e s p i t e c r i t i c i s i n g t h e F e d e r a l Government f o r a l l o w i n g 
i t s o f f i c e r s t o conduct t h e war w i t h "wanton 
b a r b a r i t y , " he v o i c e d h i s support f o r Montagu's 
amendment,^'' as d i d Gladstone and F o r s t e r . One of t h e 
l o n g e s t and most h o s t i l e speeches o f Roebuck's motion 
was d e l i v e r e d by one o f America's most s u p p o r t i v e 
25. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 171, 
gD.1771 - 1780. 
I b i d , pp.1781 - 1796. 
27. I b i d , pp.1798 - 1800. 
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members: John B r i g h t . D u r i n g B r i g h t ' s speech. Roebuck, 
who was becoming v i s i b l y angered by t h e l a c k o f support 
and t h e p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f c r i t i c i s m upon him, 
i n t e r r u p t e d t h e Member f o r Birmingham w i t h a 
c l a r i f i c a t i o n : "What I s a i d I now s t a t e t o the House -
t h a t t h e men o f t h e South were Englishmen, but t h a t the 
army o f t h e N o r t h were composed o f t h e scum of Europe." 
Roebuck's o u t b u r s t o n l y made i t more apparent t h a t of 
a l l t h e Members t h e South c o u l d have hoped t o speak f o r 
r e c o g n i t i o n , he was perhaps t h e worst p o s s i b l e 
choice.28 
A f t e r B r i g h t s a t down, i t was becoming e v i d e n t 
t h a t Roebuck's speech was not a c q u i r i n g t h e support i t 
r e q u i r e d . Of t h e s i x speakers s i n c e Roebuck, o n l y one 
- L o r d Robert C e c i l - had s u p p o r t e d h i s motion d e s p i t e 
t h e f a c t t h a t two o f them were Southern sympathisers. 
S i m i l a r l y , P e r r y Wyndham a s s e r t e d t h a t t h e r e were 
"thousands i n t h e N o r t h who wanted s e p a r a t i o n knowing 
o f t h e hapless c o n t e s t " and t h e "unholy war," b u t , i n 
s p i t e o f t hese r e s e r v a t i o n s , i n s t e a d o f s u p p o r t i n g t h e 
m o t i o n , Wyndham moved f o r adjournment.2^ 
The l a s t speaker had c l o s e d t h e c o f f i n on t h e 
m o t i o n . However, t h e members d i d not wish t o a d j o u r n 
f o r t h e r e s t i l l was a f e r v e n t d e s i r e t o c o n t i n u e 
d i s c u s s i o n - not on t h e r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e South - but 
on t h e now infamous t r i p t o P a r i s . His speech, which 
covered s e v e r a l o f t h e main i s s u e s , s e l f - d e s t r u c t e d 
28. I b i d , pp.1819 - 1824 
29. I b i d , p.1837. 
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when he introduced the hope of B r i t a i n and France 
j o i n t l y r e c o gnising the Confederacy as an independent 
nation. For i n so doing, he admitted to actions which 
were considered improper for a Member of Parliament. 
He conveyed the French Emperor's personal d e s i r e to 
"ask them [the B r i t i s h ] again whether they would be 
w i l l i n g to j o i n me i n that r e c o g n i t i o n . " This message 
to the House, which should have been passed through 
diplomatic channels, along with Roebuck's and Lindsay's 
unprecedented meeting with the French Emperor, would 
e v e n t u a l l y a t t r a c t more a t t e n t i o n than Roebuck's 
motion. The members were f a r more i n t e r e s t e d i n the 
unprecedented meeting with the French Emperor than the 
American war. For example, F o r s t e r ' s c r i t i c i s m had 
i n t e n s i f i e d when, r e f e r r i n g to Roebuck's unprecedented 
meeting with Napoleon I I I , he s a r c a s t i c a l l y s t a t e d that 
France r e q u i r e d "two ambassadors perhaps - one to 
communicate with the Government and the Member of 
S h e f f i e l d to communicate with the House of Commons." 
Af t e r Wyndham's comments, there were c r i e s and shouts 
erupting from the f l o o r for Lindsay, the other member 
who had accompanied Roebuck on the t r i p , to r i s e and 
speak. Lindsay d i d r i s e , but q u i c k l y and w i s e l y sat 
down again. 
Newegate's speech, which followed a f t e r s e v e r a l 
short speeches, was the most obvious sign that Roebuck 
had f a i l e d miserably. Instead of opening with a 
d i s c u s s i o n of recognition, he began with an attack on 
Roebuck's a c t i o n s . Newdegate b e l i e v e d "the Member of 
24 
S h e f f i e l d ' s conduct i n P a r i s " t o be an example of 
" u n a u t h o r i z e d diplomacy." He adamantly vowed t h a t he 
would v o t e a g a i n s t t h e motion.30 A f t e r a few more 
speeches. Roebuck r e q u e s t e d a resumption of t h e debate 
on t h e f o l l o w i n g Thursday. 
The P a r i s a n escapade though, was o f such i n t e r e s t 
t h a t f o r t h e next two weeks numerous members c r i t i c i z e d 
t h e a c t i o n s o f Roebuck and Lindsay. On J u l y 10, 
Newdegate s t a t e d t h a t t h i s was t h e " f i r s t t i m e i n 
P a r l i a m e n t t h a t a message o f a F o r e i g n Power had been 
r e c e i v e d n o t t h r o u g h Her Majesty's Servant" f o r he 
u n d e r s t o o d t h a t f o r e i g n messages sh o u l d t r a v e l t h r o u g h 
d i p l o m a t i c channels, n o t Members o f P a r l i a m e n t . ^ 1 On 
J u l y 13, Lindsay a d m i t t e d t o h a v i n g h e l d an audience 
w i t h Roebuck w i t h t h e French Emperor. His attempt a t 
c l a r i f y i n g and d e f e n d i n g t h e meeting f a i l e d t o stem the 
t i d e a g a i n s t him and Roebuck. Newdegate c o n s i d e r e d t he 
conduct o f t h e two MP's t o be "not o n l y h i g h l y 
i mproper" b u t a l s o " l i k e l y t o be f r a u g h t w i t h s e r i o u s 
consequences."^2 Then Palmerston, a f t e r Roebuck and 
Lindsay had spoken again i n a v a i n hope t o defend t h e i r 
a c t i o n s , s t a t e d h i s hope t h a t " t h i s w i l l be t h e l a s t 
t i m e when any Members o f t h i s House s h a l l t h i n k i t h i s 
d u t y t o communicate t o t h e B r i t i s h House o f Commons 
t h a t which may have passed between h i m s e l f and t h e 
Sovereign o f a f o r e i g n c o u n t r y " f o r "the p r o c e e d i n g 
which t h e y have adopted i s most i r r e g u l a r - t o use no 
30. I b i d , p.1840. 
31. Op c i t . 
•'2. I b i d , p.666. 
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s t r o n g e r language." He s t a t e d t h a t "Ambassadors are 
t h e p r o p e r organs f o r such communication" and " i f the 
Emperor o f t h e French, i n consequence o f t h e 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s and i n f o r m a t i o n l a i d b e f o r e him by my 
hon. F r i e n d , had any p r o p o s a l t o make t o t h e B r i t i s h 
Government t h a t p r o p o s a l ought t o come t h r o u g h some 
r e s p o n s i b l e c hannel. ""^ "^  
C l e a r l y , a f t e r Roebuck's f i r s t a t t e m p t , t h e 
South's f o r t u n e had f a i l e d t o m a t e r i a l i z e i n t h i s 
arena. I n s t e a d o f a d e v a s t a t i n g a t t a c k a g a i n s t t h e 
n e u t r a l i t y p o l i c y , t h e debate had become a r o u t as t h e 
members rose t o defend Her Majesty's Government. Yet 
t h e t e n a c i o u s Roebuck, d e s p i t e t h e i n a u s p i c i o u s 
b e g i n n i n g , was d e t e r m i n e d t o press f o r w a r d s . 
As t h e Americans b a t t l e d i n t h e East and West, 
Roebuck a t t e m p t e d t o r e g a i n t h e o f f e n s i v e on t h r e e 
d i f f e r e n t o c c a s s i o n s . On J u l y 2 he q u e s t i o n e d when 
t h e r e would be a renewal o f t h e debate. Grey requested 
t h a t Roebuck w a i t u n t i l t h e f o l l o w i n g Monday. On J u l y 
3, Grey answered t h a t " i t was c e r t a i n " t h a t t h e debate 
would resume on n e x t Monday. On J u l y 6, Palmerston 
r e p l i e d t h a t he would t r y and g i v e t h e "utmost f i x i t y 
t o t h e arrangement" a l t h o u g h he d i d not answer 
d e f i n i t i v e l y . ^ ^ 
The i n a b i l i t y o f t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s ' t o press 
t h e i r case more s t r e n u o u s l y and t o i n s i s t on more 
p a r l i a m e n t a r y t i m e owed much t o t h e i n d e c i s i v e n e s s o f 
33. I b i d , pp.666 - 672. 
34. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 172 
(London: 1863), pp.67, 177, 252. 
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t h e o f f i c i a l C o n s e r v a t i v e o p p o s i t i o n . At t h i s 
j u n c t u r e , on J u l y 9, some i n f l u e n t i a l C o n s e r v a t i v e s , 
i n c l u d i n g L ord Derby, met t o d i s c u s s "the American 
q u e s t i o n . " As Lord S t a n l e y , a c o n s e r v a t i v e M.P., 
r e c o r d e d i n h i s j o u r n a l : " A l l , except F i t z g e r a l d , 
opposed r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e South: t h e q u e s t i o n most 
d i s c u s s e d was, whether any o f f e r o f m e d i a t i o n ought t o 
be recommended t o government, o r whether i t would be 
b e t t e r s i m p l y t o l e a v e t h e m a t t e r i n t h e i r [ t h e 
Ca b i n e t ' s ] hands. The o b j e c t i o n t o t h e l a t t e r course 
i s t h a t i t appears t o amount t o an a b d i c a t i o n o f t h e i r 
f u n c t i o n by t h e O p p o s i t i o n ; and a l s o t h a t more tha n one 
h a l f o f t h e C o n s e r v a t i v e s are l i k e l y t o v o t e w i t h 
Roebuck i f he d i v i d e s , t h u s b r e a k i n g up t h e p a r t y , and 
i n d i c a t i n g an absence of u n i t e d a c t i o n . " The 
i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s d i d not even command t h e support o f 
t h e O p p o s i t i o n , l e t alone t h a t o f t h e government.35 
The e x p e c t a t i o n o f Southern m i l i t a r y success 
i n c r e a s e d t h e h e s i t a t i o n o f t h e Members o f P a r l i a m e n t 
t o f u r t h e r d i s c u s s Roebuck's mot i o n . The next day, 
s t i l l i g n o r a n t o f t h e c u r r e n t s i t u a t i o n i n America, S i r 
James Ferguson spoke a g a i n s t a resumption o f t h e 
debate. Ferguson noted: 
a g r e a t change had t a k e n p l a c e i n t h e 
p o s i t i o n o f t h e c o n t e s t between t h e two 
35. John V i n c e n t , ed., Disraeli, Derby, and the 
Conservative Party: Journals and Memoirs of Edward 
Henry, Lord Stanley, 1849-1869 (Sussex: H a r v e s t e r 
Press, 1978) , p.199.- • 
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r e p u b l i c s i n N o r t h America. The war, which 
up t o t h e p r e s e n t t i m e had been a d e f e n s i v e 
one on t h e p a r t o f t h e Southern S t a t e s , now 
appeared t o have r e c e i v e d t h e c h a r a c t e r o f an 
e x p e d i t i o n o f t h e South a g a i n s t t h e N o r t h . 
He b e l i e v e d t h a t "the s o l u t i o n t o t h e whole q u e s t i o n 
was a t hand" and saw no reason t o c o n t i n u e t h e 
d e l i b e r a t i o n s f o r " I f t h e events now t a k i n g p l a c e , and 
t h e r e s u l t o f which c o u l d not be d i s t a n t , s h o u l d have 
t h e e f f e c t o f e n a b l i n g t h e Southern St a t e s t o f o r c e 
peace on t h e N o r t h e r n , t h e former would not t h e n thank 
t h e House f o r t h e d e c i s i o n come t o on t h i s Motion."3^ 
Ferguson d e s i r e d t h a t t h e m a t t e r be dropped. 
Palmerston agreed by a s s e r t i n g t h a t t h e p r e s e n t was 
"not a moment when i t i s d e s i r a b l e t o c o n t i n u e the 
d i s c u s s i o n . " 3 ^ 
Gregory t h e n f o l l o w e d and a d m i t t e d : 
There would, no doubt, be a l a r g e m a j o r i t y 
a g a i n s t t h e M o t i o n o f t h e hon. and l e a r n e d 
Member f o r S h e f f i e l d ; b u t t h a t would not be 
owing t o any sympathy i n t h i s House i n f a v o u r 
o f t h e N o r t h , because I b e l i e v e t h a t t h e hon. 
Member f o r B r i g h t o n [Mr. Coningham] and those 
who agree w i t h him c o u l d be c a r r i e d o f f i n an 
omnibus. N e v e r t h e l e s s , i t would go f o r t h t o 
36. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 172 
(London: 1863), pp.554 - 556. 
37. I b i d , p.556 
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t h e w o r l d a t l a r g e t h a t t h e o p i n i o n o f t h e 
House o f Commons was a g a i n s t t h e independence 
o f t h e Southern Confederacy, which I b e l i e v e 
not t o be t h e case. 
T h e r e f o r e , he was o f t h e o p i n i o n t h a t Roebuck's motion 
s h o u l d be withdrawn.38 
F o r s t e r , as p r o - N o r t h as ever, r e a l i z i n g t h a t t h e 
m o t i o n would be d e f e a t e d , advocated a v o t e . He 
m a i n t a i n e d t h a t "what we have t o c o n s i d e r i s t h e 
q u e s t i o n o f whether t h i s House i s i n c l i n e d t o agree 
w i t h t h e hon. and l e a r n e d Member f o r S h e f f i e l d t h a t our 
Government s h o u l d r e c o g n i z e a seceding or r e b e l l i n g 
S t a t e b e f o r e t h e r e s u l t o f t h e secession or r e b e l l i o n 
i s a s c e r t a i n e d . " 3 9 C e c i l c l a i m e d t h a t "those who have 
ur g e d him not t o press h i s Motion are well-known 
f r i e n d s o f t h e South." The F e d e r a l s u p p o r t e r s , he 
contended, d e s i r e d t h e m o t i o n t o be d i s c u s s e d on 
Monday.40 Roebuck agreed t o have t h e d i s c u s s i o n 
postponed u n t i l Monday. A f t e r two o t h e r MP's spoke, 
Palmerston announced t h a t i t would be t h e f i r s t o r d e r 
o f b u s i n e s s . 
The House reconvened t h e debate on J u l y 13 w i t h 
s t i l l no news c o n c e r n i n g t h e watershed events o f one 
week b e f o r e . Roebuck, though, r e a l i z e d h i s a s s a u l t had 
f a i l e d r a t h e r m i s e r a b l y . He confessed t h a t he "brought 
f o r w a r d t h e M o t i o n under t h e f e e l i n g t h a t I was about 
38 I b i d , p.563. 
39, I b i d , p.564. 
40. Op c i t . 
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to ask the House to take a step which would be l i k e l y 
to put an end to the t e r r i b l e carnage now going on i n 
North America, and which would a l s o be of i n f i n i t e 
advantage to the commercial i n t e r e s t s of Great 
B r i t a i n . " Roebuck admitted h i s withdrawal with the 
statement " i t i s only under a f e e l i n g of great respect 
for the noble Lord that I now withdraw my Motion."^^ 
This great debate had ended. 
Four days l a t e r news reached B r i t a i n concerning 
the r e s u l t of the B a t t l e of Gettysburg. Three days 
a f t e r t h i s , the B r i t i s h learned that Vicksburg had 
c a p i t u l a t e d . The South had l o s t on a l l three f r o n t s ; 
never again was i n t e r v e n t i o n i n any form to be ag i t a t e d 
i n Parliament. 
In order to understand why the Southern e f f o r t i n 
Parliament f a i l e d , i t i s necessary to examine the 
i s s u e s which were debated by both s i d e s . These i s s u e s 
can be d i v i d e d i n t o four groups: the blockade, economic 
i s s u e s , i s s u e s of morality, and considerations of 
B r i t i s h f o r e i g n p o l i c y . The f i r s t of these i s s u e s 
which were e x p l o i t e d by the i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s , which 
dominated the debates from the beginning of the war 
u n t i l 1862, was the blockade. 
41 I b i d , pp.661 - 668 
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I I . The Blockade: Laughable or Legal? 
"The blockade i s the laughing stock of the Southern 
merchant marine." - B r i t i s h Consul Bunch, August, 20, 
1861.1 
"A great many vessels are captured; i t i s [a] most 
serious i n t e r r u p t i o n t o Trade." - Lord Lyons, November 
29, 1861.2 
On A p r i l 19, 1861, President Abraham Lincoln 
issued h i s proclamation f o r the establishment of a 
blockade along the e n t i r e Southern c o a s t l i n e . By the 
end of May, most of the v i t a l Southern ports had a few 
warships on blockade duty.*^ The r e s u l t i n g blockade, or 
lack thereof depending upon one's perspective, received 
the immediate a t t e n t i o n of the B r i t i s h , e s p e c i a l l y i n 
the H a l l s of Parliament. 
The blockade was the f i r s t issue discussed 
concerning the American C i v i l War f o r two reasons. 
F i r s t of a l l , the war was expected t o l a s t f o r only 
n i n e t y days. Thus, there appeared t o be l i t t l e reason 
t o discuss the causes and the issues of the war i n 
exhaustive d e t a i l . The North was expected t o capture 
Richmond w i t h i n t h a t time or the South's determination 
^. Frank Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy (Chicago: 
U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago Press, 1959), p.233. 
^. E.D. Adams, Great Britain and the American Civil War 
(London: Longman, Greens, and Company, 1925), p.254. 
^. I b i d , p.245. 
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would p r e v a i l and there would be a peaceful separation. 
No one a n t i c i p a t e d a war which would l a s t f o r four 
years and cost 600,000 l i v e s . 
The second reason t h a t the blockade received the 
i n i t i a l a t t e n t i o n of Parliament was due t o the f a c t 
t h a t i t s e f f e c t i v e n e s s was questionable. At the 
beginning of the war, the United States Navy had the 
d i f f i c u l t y of coping w i t h 3,000 miles of Southern 
shoreline w i t h only two dozen steamers.^ 
The i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s ' motive i n pressing the 
B r i t i s h Government t o determine the blockade t o be 
i n e f f e c t i v e i s e a s i l y understood. I f the blockade was 
determined t o be i n e f f e c t i v e , merchant ships would have 
the l e g a l r i g h t t o trade w i t h the Southern p o r t s . No 
doubt, a considerable number of these ships would be 
B r i t i s h . I f the United States Navy attempted t o 
prevent passage of a B r i t i s h ship, Palmerston would be 
forced t o defend the Union Jack. Scenarios l i k e t h i s 
would d r a m a t i c a l l y increase the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t Great 
B r i t a i n and the United States would become involved i n 
a war. E i t h e r way, the Confederacy benefited. 
The i n e v i t a b i l i t y of c o n f l i c t w i t h the United 
States i f the blockade was challenged was mentioned on 
a few occasions. I n March of 1862 Russell stated t h a t 
i f the blockade was determined t o be i n e f f e c t i v e , " I 
know of no course which would have been open but war 
w i t h the United States." On February 20, 1862, 
O'Donoghue warned t h a t " to force the blockade meant 
Owsley, p. 230 
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war w i t h America." On March 7, 1862, the S o l i c i t o r 
General s t a t e d : 
An armed n e u t r a l i t y , by which a Government 
would break through the blockading force t h a t 
was besieging a country, would set at naught 
a l l the usages of nations. I t would be doing 
a h o s t i l e act at the p o i n t of the sword, not 
at the p e r i l of war, but w i t h war as i t s 
necessary consequence.^ 
And on March 10, 1862 Lord Abinger stated "Were they t o 
attempt t o r a i s e the blockade, our cr u i s e r s would 
i n e v i t a b l y be brought i n t o contact w i t h the Federal 
squadron, which would not admit our r i g h t t o i n t e r f e r e , 
and a c o l l i s o n would t h i s be brought on between the two 
na t i o n s . " ^ 
The i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s f a i l e d t o mention t h i s 
p o s s i b i l i t y and instead attacked the blockade on the 
ground t h a t i t was both i l l e g a l and i n e f f e c t i v e . I n 
terms of l e g a l i t y , the blockade was judged by the 
pr o v i s i o n s of the 1856 Declaration of Paris. A u s t r i a , 
France, Great B r i t a i n , Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, and 
Turkey had a l l agreed t o abide by the d e c l a r a t i o n . 
Owing t o the s t i p u l a t i o n concerning p r i v a t e e r s , the 
United States refused t o subscribe by the Declaration. 
However at the beginning of the c i v i l war, the Lincoln 
^. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 165, 
Dp.1243, 380, 1223. 
I b i d , p.1237. 
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a d m i n i s t r a t i o n agreed t o adhere t o the Declaration as 
i t p e r t a i n e d t o blockades. The Declaration stated t h a t 
"blockades, i n order t o be binding, must be e f f e c t i v e ; 
t h a t i s t o say, maintained by forces strong enough t o 
prevent access."'' 
This d e f i n i t i o n was rather ambiguous which allowed 
Members t o form t h e i r own i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s depending 
upon whether they supported i n t e r v e n t i o n or n e u t r a l i t y . 
The i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s i n t e r p r e t e d the d e f i n i t i o n 
s t r i c t l y and thus determined t h a t Lincoln's blockade 
was i n e f f e c t i v e . I n May, 1861 i n the House of Lords, 
the E a r l of Ellenborough i n s i s t e d t h a t blockades " i n 
order t o be binding, must be e f f e c t i v e - t h a t i s t o 
say, maintained by a force s u f f i c i e n t r e a l l y t o prevent 
access t o the coast of the enemy." He believed t h a t 
the Union one was "impossible" t o maintain. The Earl 
of Derby, the leader of the Opposition i n the House of 
Lords, warned t h a t "a mere paper blockade, or a 
blockade extending over a space which i t i s p h y s i c a l l y 
impossible t h a t an e f f e c t u a l blockade can be applied, 
w i l l not be recognised as v a l i d by the B r i t i s h 
Government."® 
The i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s attacked the blockade several 
times i n 1862. On February 7, Gregory "believed he 
should be i n a p o s i t i o n t o show t h a t i n a great measure 
t h i s blockade could only be considered a paper 
blockade."^ On March 7, numerous i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s , 
E.D. Adams, p.140. 
^. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 163, p.2077. 
^. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 165, p.92. 
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e s p e c i a l l y Gregory, questioned the l e g a l i t y of the 
blockade. Since Union troops had occupied southern 
Louisiana, Gregory d i d confess t h a t "the blockade of 
New Orleans was an e f f e c t i v e blockade" but "as regards 
other p o r t s , t h i s has been a delusion," f o r " a l l the 
evidence which can be brought forward shows t h a t these 
very p o r t s of Wilmington and Charleston are not 
blockaded, and t h a t not one of those conditions which 
c o n s t i t u t e an e f f e c t i v e blockade are applicable t o 
these p a r t i c u l a r p o r t s . " He f u r t h e r s t a t e d t h a t he 
"must pronounce the d e c l a r a t i o n of Paris t o be, as 
regards the Confederate States, a mockery; as regards 
the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, a delusion." 
He even quoted a French lawyer who stated t h a t "Among 
the f i c t i t i o u s blockades invented by b e l l i g e r e n t s , i t 
w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t t o allude t o the blockade by 
c r u i s e r s , t o which the Northern States have resorted." 
Ferguson asserted t h a t " t h i s blockade could not be 
defended on the ground t h a t i t had been e i t h e r 
continuous or e f f e c t i v e " and th e r e f o r e i t was an 
" i l l e g a l " and " i n e f f e c t i v e " blockade. 
The n e u t r a l i s t s countered the i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s on 
t h i s p o i n t by contending t h a t the blockade was indeed 
l e g a l and j u s t i f i e d by using less s t r i n g e n t d e f i n i t i o n s 
f o r an e f f e c t i v e blockade. In May of 1861, Russell, i n 
10. I b i d , pp.1158-1204. I n response, on March 8, 1862, 
The Times wrote "What Mr. Gregory does not allege, and 
cannot al l e g e i s t h a t the Federal Government has not 
done i t s best i t has found means f o r a blockade 
s u f f i c i e n t " and "The blockade i s maintained only too 
w e l l . " 
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quoting Lord Lyons, announced t h a t "the blockade i s 
c a r r i e d i n t o e f f e c t according t o the rules established 
by the law of nations" and t h a t "we must of course 
conform t o i t ; and t h a t we can only see t h a t the 
blockade i s s u f f i c i e n t and regular. "H E a r l G r a n v i l l e 
a l l e g e d t h a t an e f f e c t i v e blockade would not have t o 
make passage "impossible" but "very d i f f i c u l t f o r 
vessels t o obt a i n egress or ingress" while Lord 
Brougham defined an e f f e c t i v e blockade as one which 
"precluded the existence of any reasonable chance of 
entrance. "**• 
During the debate of March, 1862, the S o l i c i t o r 
General, Milnes, and W.E. Forster a l l defended the 
l e g a l i t y of the blockade. The S o l i c i t o r General, who 
provided one of the most extensive discussions on the 
l e g a l i t y of the blockade, opened h i s speech by asking 
the Members upon "what p r i n c i p l e s ought Great B r i t a i n 
t o judge t h i s question of the blockade t o which the 
present Motion r e f e r s ? " He answered t h a t "Great 
B r i t a i n must judge t h a t question according t o her own 
p r i n c i p l e s ; according t o the p r i n c i p l e s of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law." He f u r t h e r questioned "What are 
the e s s e n t i a l s involved i n a l e g a l blockade?" His 
answer was t h a t there "must be a bona f i d e blockade by 
a force s u f f i c i e n t t o maintain i t on the spot, and 
there must also be a s u f f i c i e n t n o t i f i c a t i o n of some 
ki n d or other of t h a t blockade." I n response t o the 
11. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 164, p.188. 
12. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 163, 
p.2077. 
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charge t h a t not a l l of the Southern ports were 
blockaded he s t a t e d t h a t " i f there were some ports 
which were blockaded, the blockade was p e r f e c t l y good 
at those places, although w i t h regards t o other points 
of the coast i t could not be said t o e x i s t . " By t h i s 
clever d e f i n i t i o n , the United States could blockade 
Savannah, leave Charleston alone, and s t i l l have the 
blockade l e g a l l y operating at Savannah while having the 
f u t u r e p o s s i b i l i t y of blockading Charleston. The law 
o f f i c e r had provided the United States w i t h a l l the 
loopholes necessary t o l e g a l l y maintain the blockade. 
Furthermore, he asked: 
Did the President, i n h i s proclamation 
d e c l a r a t o r y of t h i s blockade, announce any 
i n t e n t i o n of s e t t i n g aside the law of 
nations? Quite the contrary. He said the 
por t s should be blockaded i n pursuance of the 
laws of the United States and the law of 
nations. 
I n c o n t i n u i n g he noted: 
But on what i s the opinion of t h i s country t o 
be formed? I t can only be formed on the 
reports of i t s consular and naval o f f i c e r s . 
And, speaking generally, what i s the r e s u l t 
of these reports? That, though, i n c e r t a i n 
places, and at c e r t a i n times there was e i t h e r 
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no blockade at a l l , or very great remissness 
i n e n f o r c i n g the blockade, there was at other 
times and i n other places, and i n some places 
at a l l times, a s t r i c t enforcement of the 
blockade. 
Like the S o l i c i t o r General, Milnes and Forster 
defended the blockade on l e g a l grounds. Milnes stated 
t h a t "This blockade scarcely appears t o me t o merit the 
c r i t i c i s m which has been bestowed on i t " and " i t 
appears t o me t h a t the common sense of the question 
must lead us t o the conclusion t h a t t h i s blockade i s 
e f f e c t i v e . " I n r e f e r r i n g t o the Declaration of Paris 
p r o v i s i o n on blockades, Forster contended t h a t " i f 
blockades are t o be i n t e r p r e t e d i n [the] f u t u r e by a l l 
the Powers who signed the t r e a t y s t r i c t l y by those 
words, then there i s an end of a l l blockades." He 
quoted Russell's statement t h a t the " f a c t t h a t various 
ships may have suc c e s s f u l l y escaped through i t w i l l not 
of i t s e l f prevent the blockade from being an e f f e c t i v e 
one by i n t e r n a t i o n a l law" and thus Forster concluded 
t h a t "the argument, whether t h i s blockade i s e f f e c t i v e 
. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 165, 
pp.1214-1225. The S o l i c i t o r General's speech was w e l l 
remembered by the i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s , f o r on June 29, 
1863 Lord Robert C e c i l s t a t e d t h a t " I n i t s e l f , the 
blockade was a t h i n g , which, considering the 
o b l i g a t i o n s of the Treaty of Paris, the world could 
never have expected t o see again," f o r the "blockade 
was kept up mainly owing t o the ingenious special 
pleading of the S o l i c i t o r General two years ago." 
Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 171, p.1647. 
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or not, i s r e a l l y made t o depend upon the number of 
escapees."1^ 
Indeed, c r i t i c a l t o the argument was the number of 
ships which had evaded Lincoln's blockade. The 
i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s provided f a c t s on numerous occassions 
which i n d i c a t e d t h a t there were vast numbers of ships 
evading the blockade while the n e u t r a l i s t s c o n s i s t e n t l y 
challenged the f i g u r e s . 
I n the House of Lords on February 10, 1862, the 
E a r l of Malmesbury sta t e d h i s desire " to know the r e a l 
f a c t s , and what i s e x a c t l y t h a t s t a t e of the blockade?" 
R e f e r r i n g t o the Confederate emissary i n London, he 
commented t h a t "Mr. Mason openly declares t h a t no 
less than 600 t o 700 ships have broken the blockade and 
passed i n and out of Southern ports."1^ 
Russell proceeded t o attack Mason's f i g u r e s . He 
r e c a l l e d t h a t he had questioned Mason concerning "the 
tonnage of those vessels t o which reference was made; 
and t o t h a t question he was unable t o give me an 
answer." Therefore, i f the blockade running vessels 
were of small size they "can hardly, from t h e i r 
i n s i g n i f i c a n t character, be regarded as breaking the 
blockade."1^ 
On March 7, 18 62, the i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s again 
attacked the blockade through the use of the number of 
1*. I b i d , p.1187-1190. The evening a f t e r t h i s 
discussion B r i g h t recorded i n h i s d i a r y "W.E. Forster's 
speech good, and h i s f a c t s q u i t e d e s t r u c t i v e of case 
against blockade. S o l i c i t o r General made an admirable 
fgeech, - language, f a c t s , sentiments good." I b i d , p.113. 
1^. I b i d , p.116. 
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successful blockade runners. Gregory stated t h a t "400 
ships" had run the blockade "and, as regards the trade 
and commerce of the world, [the blockade i s ] nothing 
but a snare. "^ "^  
Forster took issue w i t h the "400" escapees. He 
f i r s t began by n o t i n g t h a t there were not 400, but 322 
boats and "of the 322 boats which escaped from Southern 
p o r t s , only 147 l e f t a f t e r the 15 day grace period, 25 
were r i v e r boats, 106 were coasters, a l l but three are 
'quasi i n l a n d . ' " He contended t h a t i t was " p e r f e c t l y 
absurd t o suppose t h a t the voyage of a vessel behind 
lagoons, and scarcely appearing i n the open sea, was a 
breach of the blockade." He then s t a t e d t h a t there 
were "16 departures t o f o r e i g n p o r t s , 15 t o American 
ones, c h i e f l y t o Cuba, 1 schooner from Charleston t o 
L i v e r p o o l . " Thus, according t o Forster, there were not 
400 escapees but only t h i r t y - t w o . 
The n e u t r a l i s t s also employed several other 
s t r a t e g i e s t o counter the i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s . These 
t a c t i c s were u s u a l l y used by one member on one 
p a r t i c u l a r occassion. One of these involved claiming 
t h a t B r i t a i n was at f a u l t f o r the blockade runners 
since most of them were B r i t i s h . Cobden admitted t h a t : 
I know t h a t the contraband trade t o the South 
i s a l l from England, t h a t i t i s c a r r i e d , not 
only l a r g e l y , but e x c l u s i v e l y from England; 
1"'. I b i d , p.1170 
18. I b i d , p.1190 
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and when we a l l know t h i s , i s i t not 
something l i k e a f f e c t a t i o n t o come down t o 
t h i s House and o f f e r complaints as i f we were 
innocent p a r t i e s . 1 ^ 
On February 20, 1862, O'Donoghue also used t h i s 
s t r a t e g y by requesting i n f o r m a t i o n on blockade runners. 
He, who be l i e v e d there "to be no j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r 
c a l l i n g the blockade a paper one," claimed t h a t the 
a u t h o r i t i e s i n Nassau had allowed supplies f o r ships 
destined t o the South and requested t h a t the B r i t i s h 
Government provide i n f o r m a t i o n on the British ships 
which had run the blockade. This was indeed an 
ingenious request f o r instead of p r o v i d i n g f i g u r e s 
which would show t h a t the blockade was i n e f f e c t i v e , the 
f i g u r e s requested would show t h a t B r i t i s h seamen were 
breaking the blockade i n v i o l a t i o n of the Queen's 
20 
n e u t r a l i t y proclamation.^" 
Layard, the Deputy Foreign Secretary, recognized 
the shrewd s t r a t e g y and answered t h a t he "would not 
f e e l j u s t i f i e d i n g i v i n g i t , f o r i t was hardly t o be 
expected t h a t the Government would l a y on the t a b l e a 
l i s t of wrong doers who had broken the blockade." The 
S o l i c i t o r General added t h a t Her Majesty's proclamation 
"does not touch i n any way whatever p r i v a t e merchant 
vessels." He concluded by defending the a u t h o r i t i e s at 
Nassau, from where many of the blockade runners 
1^. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 171, 
D.1653. 
20, Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 165, p.528, 
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departed, f o r t a k i n g "the only course which i t was 
possible t o take c o n s i s t e n t l y w i t h the law of the 
land."21 
Another n e u t r a l i s t s t r a t e g y used h i s t o r i c a l 
precedents t o determine the blockade t o be e f f e c t i v e . 
I n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r case, Russell was drawing a p a r a l l e l 
between the B r i t i s h blockade of Europe during the 
Napoleonic wars and the current blockade by the United 
States. I n June of 1863, Russell s t a t e d t h a t : 
I do not see how we can say, although we 
consider the blockade of 2000 miles of coast 
t o be p e r f e c t l y l e g i t i m a t e , a blockade of 
2, 500 or 3, 000 miles i s such a monster of 
i l l e g a l i t y t h a t we should f i n d i t impossible 
22 
t o r e c o g n i z e . " 
The n e u t r a l i s t s also had t o contend w i t h the 
a l l e g a t i o n t h a t since the Royal Navy was the world's 
most powerful, and t h a t blockades were one of B r i t a i n ' s 
most e f f e c t i v e weapons, t h a t i t was i n her s e l f -
i n t e r e s t t o recognise an i n e f f e c t i v e blockade as a 
l e g a l one. On March 7, 1862, the S o l i c i t o r General 
responded t o these charges by r e c a l l i n g t h a t a French 
21. I b i d , p.530. 
22. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 171, p.883 
One year before, on A p r i l 22, 1862, Russell wrote t o 
Clarendon: " I t i s t r u e t h a t our ships, evading the 
blockade f u r n i s h them w i t h w a r l i k e stores; but t h a t i s 
by reason of the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of blockading 
e f f e c t i v e l y the three thousand miles of coast. 
Walpole, Russell, p.324. 
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lawyer declared " t h a t you have a paper blockade i n 
America, and t h a t England, the u n i v e r s a l patroness of 
paper blockades, connives at and supports i t , doubtless 
w i t h a view t o her own advantage i n f u t u r e times." I n 
response, the S o l i c i t o r General adamantly sta t e d t h a t 
"We w i l l not have one r u l e f o r the time when we are 
b e l l i g e r e n t s and another f o r a time we are neutrals."23 
The Times agreed and wrote on March 8, 18 62, "they [the 
North] ascribe our acquiescence i n the blockade t o our 
s e l f i s h regard f o r t h i s ; our c h i e f weapon of maritime 
war; but they are as much mistaken as he [Gregory] i s 
when he t e l l s us t h a t we are not honesty n e u t r a l . " 
Another rare n e u t r a l i s t s t r a t e g y was t o assert 
t h a t B r i t a i n was at f a u l t f o r being the creator and the 
main perpetuator of the blockade as a weapon of war. 
This was the argument of Richard Cobden, who, although 
not as passionately Northern i n h i s sympathies as his 
f r i e n d B r i g h t , d i d support n e u t r a l i t y towards the end 
of the war.24 I n t h i s debate, Cobden f i r s t c r i t i c i z e d 
blockades i n general as "a mode of warfare" which "can 
be objected t o on the ground of n a t u r a l j u s t i c e . " He 
spoke of the "greater i n j u r y and s u f f e r i n g i n f l i c t e d by 
t h i s blockade on the manufacturing towns of England ... 
23, Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 165, 
D 1212. 
^*. Cobden even considered supporting i n t e r v e n t i o n . On 
September 15, 1862, Lord Stanley, a conservative M.P. 
wrote, i n reference t o Cobden, "he himself deplored the 
waste of blood and money, i n c l i n e d t o t h i n k the contest 
useless, acknowledged t h a t England alone could do no 
good by i n t e r f e r i n g , but thought i t possible t h a t a 
mediation by a l l the leading European powers j o i n t l y 
might succeed." Vincent, p. 191. 
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than upon any town i n the United States, apart from the 
loss of l i f e and limb upon the b a t t l e f i e d . " He 
continued by a s s e r t i n g t h a t the blockade r e s u l t e d i n : 
the misery of hundreds of thousands of 
innocent people deprived of the means of 
earning t h e i r d a i l y bread by honest i n d u s t r y , 
by means of t h i s war. But who are c h i e f l y 
responsible f o r t h i s system of warfare? 
Undoubtedly the p u b l i c men of t h i s country, 
and those who uphold commercial blockades as 
a means of warfare. I t i s only our own 
p r i n c i p l e , c a r r i e d out w i t h dreadful s e v e r i t y 
against ourselves - the p r i n c i p l e which we 
have cherished i n the b e l i e f , t h a t when we 
become b e l l i g e r e n t s , i t would be of advantage 
t o ourselves.25 
Cobden had ingeniously countered the a l l e g a t i o n s of the 
i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s of blockades by focusing h i s e n t i r e 
c r i t i c i s m on B r i t a i n as the mother of a l l blockades. 
Cobden's mention of the s u f f e r i n g population of 
England was also used t o b o l s t e r the arguments of 
n e u t r a l i s t s . The Confederates had u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y 
provided evidence t h a t the blockade was e f f e c t i v e 
through t h e i r self-embargo of cotton. I t was hoped 
t h a t by exacerbating the cotton shortage, B r i t a i n and 
25. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 171, 
pp.1651-1652. 
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France would be more i n c l i n e d - out of s e l f - i n t e r e s t -
t o support the Confederacy. However, on March 10, 
1862, c i t i n g the dearth of d e l i v e r e d cotton i n order t o 
defend the blockade, Russell remarked t h a t "the 
i n t e l l i g e n c e which we have received - shows t h a t there 
has been no such uninterupted intercourse."2^ On 
February 20, 1862, O'Donoghue noted t h a t "the dearth of 
cotton seemed t o show t h a t the blockade was most 
e f f e c t i v e . " 2 7 
The p o p u l a r i t y of the blockade as a t a r g e t f o r the 
i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s l a s t e d u n t i l 1862. By t h a t time, the 
war's d u r a t i o n and i n t e n s i t y allowed f o r more 
exhaustive discussions on the merits of i n t e r v e n t i o n . 
Furthermore, the North had begun making clear progress 
at t i g h t e n i n g the blockade.28 Thus, the blockade was 
replaced by a p r o l i f e r a t i o n of issues. One of those 
2^. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 165, 
p.1240. 
27 I b i d , p.527. 
28. Only a few times i n 1863 the blockade was 
c r i t i c i s e d . For example, on March 23, Lord Campbell 
s t a t e d t h a t "allowance has been made f o r the 
d i f f i c u l t i e s which the United States had t o contend 
w i t h i n the war; and t h a t p u b l i c law has been l i b e r a l l y 
i n t e r p r e t e d i n t h e i r favour," and "the B r i t i s h 
Government has not been ready t o maintain them [the 
North] i n the v i t a l p o i n t t h a t blockades must be 
e f f e c t i v e t o be b i n d i n g . " Hansard's Parliamentary 
Debates, Volume 169, p.1726. On June 15, the Marquess 
of Carnafan claimed t h a t "The i n e f f i c i e n c y of the 
blockade was the main cause of the complaint. I t was 
no reproach t o the Federal Government t h a t the 
blockade, which was much more e f f i c i e n t at the 
beginning of the war, has ceased t o be so now. The 
question was whether t h i s was a blockade which ought 
any longer t o be recognised; and he thought p e r f e c t l y 
c l e a r t h a t i t was not." Hansard's Parliamentary 
Debates, Volume 171, p.878. Most a u t h o r i t i e s believed 
t h a t the blockade was becoming more e f f e c t i v e , not less 
as Campbell claimed. 
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i s s u e s , which Cobden had mentioned during h i s 
d i s c u s s i o n of the blockade, was the s u f f e r i n g which was 
a r e s u l t of the cotton shortage. With the expansion i n 
the i s s u e s debated, economic s e l f - i n t e r e s t was an 
argument e x p l o i t e d by both i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s and 
n e u t r a l i s t s . 
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I I I . The Economic I s s u e s : 
The Coup De Grace of King Cotton 
"The cards are i n our hands, and we intend to play them 
out to the bankruptcy of every cotton f a c t o r y i n Great 
B r i t a i n and France, or the acknowledgement of our 
independence." Charleston Mercury, June 4, 1861^ 
"The notion of g e t t i n g cotton by i n t e r f e r i n g with the 
o 
blockade i s abandoned." John Bright, November 20, 1861* 
On March 4, 1858, a United States Senator from 
South C a r o l i n a spoke the words that were i n the minds 
and on the l i p s of many of the Southerners. James 
Hammond s t a t e d : 
What would happen i f no cotton was furnished 
for three years? I w i l l not stop to depict 
what everyone would imagine, but t h i s i s 
c e r t a i n : England would topple headlong and 
c a r r y the whole c i v i l i z e d world with her save 
the South. No, you dare not make war on 
cotton. No power on earth dares make war 
upon i t . Cotton i s King.-* 
Quoted from E.D. Adams, Volume 2, p. 5. 
2. I b i d , p.15. 
3. S e i e c t i o / i s from the Letters and Speeches of the Hon. 
James H. Hammond of South Carolina (New York, 1866), 
pp.316-317. 
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The b e l i e f i n B r i t a i n ' s dependence upon cotton was 
not without b a s i s . The cotton industry was B r i t a i n ' s 
l a r g e s t i n d u s t r y and, i n the case of Lancashire, eighty 
percent of the cotton imported was from the southern 
United S t a t e s , The American cotton was of higher 
q u a l i t y than Indian cotton, which had been considered 
as a p o s s i b l e replacement by the B r i t i s h . Furthermore, 
n e a r l y t w o - f i f t h s of B r i t a i n ' s export trade was 
comprised by manufactured cotton products. I t i s a l s o 
estimated that out of the United Kingdom's t o t a l 
population of twenty-one m i l l i o n , four m i l l i o n people 
were dependent upon the cotton i n d u s t r y . ^ 
During the war, t h i s f e a r of the r a m i f i c a t i o n s of 
the cotton shortage reached the upper l e v e l s of 
government. This was best exemplified by the w r i t i n g s 
of the Chancellor of the Exchequer William Gladstone i n 
the autumn of 1862 when he was c l e a r l y concerned with 
the r e a c t i o n of the people of Lancashire. On September 
24 Gladstone wrote to Palmerston h i s concern over 
p u b l i c opinion: 
The population of Lancashire have borne t h e i r 
s u f f e r i n g s with a f o r t i t u d e and patience 
exceeding a l l example, and almost a l l b e l i e f . 
But i f any one of the great towns. 
Leland H. Jenks, The Migration of British Capital to 
1875 (New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1963), p.470; 
B a r r i e R a t c l i f f e , ed. Great Britain and Her World 
(Manchester: Manchester U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1975), p.l54; 
Frank Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy (Chicago: 
U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago Press, 1959), p.8. 
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r e s i g n a t i o n should, even for a s i n g l e day, 
give p l a c e to excitement, and an outbreak 
should occur, our p o s i t i o n i n the face of 
America, and our in f l u e n c e for good might be 
s e r i o u s l y a f f e c t e d : we might then seem to be 
i n t e r f e r i n g , with l o s s of d i g n i t y on the 
ground of our immediate i n t e r e s t s , and rather 
i n the a t t i t u d e of p a r t i e s than as 
repre s e n t i n g the general i n t e r e s t s of 
humanity and peace.^ 
In h i s essay which he prepared f o r the Cabinet on 
October 25, Gladstone again acknowledged the presence 
of the c r i s i s and h i s concern with the p u b l i c opinion 
of those s u f f e r i n g . He wrote: 
The t e r r i b l e d i s t r e s s of Lancashire has thus 
f a r been borne with h e r o i c patience and with 
p e r f e c t submission to the law. But, with a l l 
our confidence i n the people, who can be 
c e r t a i n t h a t the p o s i t i v e s u f f e r i n g , the 
a c t u a l hunger which we have every reason to 
fe a r i s endured there, may not at some time, 
at some place, perhaps from some apparently 
t r i v i a l i n c i d e n t , give r i s e to an outbreak? 
He f u r t h e r contended "that i t i s c e r t a i n l y the one 
which has i n f l i c t e d , beyond a l l comparison, the 
Guedella, p.233 
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s e v e r e s t s u f f e r i n g on the other countries of the world, 
and has given them the best t i t l e to be heard, i f they 
s h a l l t h i n k f i t to speak, on the question of i t s 
continuance."^ For Gladstone, those who were i n the 
best p o s i t i o n to advocate an a l t e r a t i o n i n n e u t r a l i t y 
were those who were s u f f e r i n g . 
However, there were a l s o those who b e l i e v e d that 
i n t e r v e n t i o n because of cotton was r i d i c u l o u s . Lord 
Clarendon wrote "A proposal from us to mediate would be 
a t t r i b u t e d , I expect, to a f o r l o r n hope of getting out 
cotton during the f o r t n i g h t or month that the a r m i s t i c e 
would l a s t , and t h i s would be an a d d i t i o n a l reason for 
r e j e c t i n g i t and laughing at us."'' 
In Parliament, both the Southern and the Northern 
sympathisers s e i z e d upon these i s s u e s to f u r t h e r t h e i r 
arguments. The i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s claimed that B r i t a i n 
should intervene to renew the cotton trade while the 
n e u t r a l i s t s warned that B r i t a i n should not jeopardize 
her v i t a l g r a i n trade with the United States by 
i n t e r v e n i n g i n the war. 
As compared to other i s s u e s though, the cotton 
shortage was d i s c u s s e d much l e s s . I t never a t t a i n e d 
the dominant s t a t u s as a persuasive i s s u e that some 
Confederates might have expected. The reason for t h i s 
minimal a t t e n t i o n l a y i n the f a c t that Gladstone had 
mentioned: while i t was easy to recognise the 
6. I b i d , pp.239 - 247. 
Herbert Maxwell, The Life and Letters of George 
William Frederick Fourth Earl of Clarendon (London; 
Edward Arnold, 1913), p.265. 
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c o r r e l a t i o n between the economic d i s t r e s s and the 
cotton shortage, i t was f a r more d i f f i c u l t to determine 
i f those s u f f e r i n g advocated i n t e r v e n t i o n or 
n e u t r a l i t y . ^ 
C u r i o u s l y , i n d i s c u s s i n g the cotton shortage, both 
si d e s accepted that the shortage was the r e s u l t of the 
war. Yet l a t e r h i s t o r i a n s have argued that the 
depression and the unemployment of the cotton industry 
was a r e s u l t of other more long-term trends. In Great 
Britain and her World, 1750-1914, the conclusion 
concerning the Lancashire c r i s i s was that "the C i v i l 
War was not r e s p o n s i b l e for the i n d u s t r i a l depression 
i n Lancashire, d i d not s e r i o u s l y deplete the stocks of 
raw cotton h e l d i n B r i t a i n and was important only i n so 
f a r as i t induced expectations of a future shortage of 
s u p p l i e s . The depression was almost wholly upon the 
preceding period of production which had expanded f a r 
i n excess of any e x i s t i n g demand." In f a c t , the 
antebellum cotton shipments were of such quantity 
that, according to Frank Owsley, the cotton m i l l s by 
December, 1861, had 200,000 more bales of raw cotton 
than the previous year. However, the n e u t r a l i s t s never 
challenged the b e l i e f t h a t the d i s t r e s s was a d i r e c t 
r e s u l t of the American C i v i l War. Thus, i n the 
process, whether i n t e r n t i o n a l l y or a c c i d e n t l y , they 
^. H i s t o r i a n s have a l s o had d i f f i c u l t y i n answering 
'if t h i s question, E.D. Adams and E r i c Foner supported the 
b e l i e f that the Lancashire population o v e r a l l was pro-
North while Owsley and Mary E l l i s o n contended that the 
population was b a s i c a l l y of a southern persuasion. 
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s u b s t a n t i a t e d the a l l e g a t i o n that B r i t a i n was 
n o t i c e a b l y s u f f e r i n g due to the war. 
The s t o c k p i l e of raw cotton may e x p l a i n why the 
cotton shortage d i d not become an i s s u e i n 1861. The 
d i s t r e s s was not considered worthy of mention by the 
Members of Parliament u n t i l ten months a f t e r Fort 
Sumter when the e f f e c t of the cotton shortage had 
reached c r i s i s proportions.^ At l a s t , on February 7, 
1862, Gregory, s t a t e d that there were " e f f e c t s which 
the lamentable war i n America had produced upon the 
i n d u s t r y of the United Kingdom." He pleaded that " i n 
j u s t i c e to the s u f f e r i n g manufacturing populations of 
t h i s country" the "House could not take too e a r l y an 
opportunity of d i s c u s s i n g t h i s s u b j e c t . " ^ ^ 
A f t e r t h i s f i r s t mention, the cotton shortage 
would be d i s c u s s e d four more times and each time a 
Member would attempt to remind t h e i r fellow members 
tha t the d i s t r e s s was a d i r e c t r e s u l t of the war. On 
March 7, 1862, Bentick asked whether " i t was not the 
case that the non-recognition of the Southern 
States...was a great source of inconvenience to the 
manufacturing i n t e r e s t s of t h i s country?" On Jul y 18, 
1862, Lindsay c a l l e d the a t t e n t i o n of the House "to 
what our manufacturing d i s t r i c t s were s u f f e r i n g by the 
stoppage of cotton from the Southern States of 
America," for "By the l a s t accounts the d i s t r e s s had 
^. B a r r i e R a t c l i f f e , ed.. Great Britain and her World, 
1750-1914 (Manchester: Manchester U n i v e r s i t y Press, 
1975), p.159; Owsley, p.8. 
Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 165, p.92. 
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i n c r e a s e d to a degree almost u n p a r a l l e l e d . " He claimed 
that, because of the war, 15,000 were r e c e i v i n g r e l i e f 
i n Blackburn while Preston had 12,000 s u f f e r i n g . Lord 
Campbell, on March 23, 1863, a s s e r t e d that the 
"Lancashire d i s t r e s s " was due to the L i n c o l n 
Administration, which he considered "despotism." In 
t h i s vein, Campbell claimed that, i f the North won, "on 
t h i s overgrown, on t h i s portentous form of tyranny and 
egotism, many count r i e s would depend for the ma t e r i a l 
of that important in d u s t r y which languishes at 
present."^^ 
On June 30, 1863, the cotton shortage received a 
prominent pl a c e i n Roebuck's speech. To Roebuck, the 
cotton shortage was an a d d i t i o n a l reason to recognise 
the independence of the Confederacy "because i t i s our 
i n t e r e s t , " He s t a t e d that "Thousands, nay, nearly a 
m i l l i o n , of your people are s u f f e r i n g from the want of 
these very commodities which we can supply." He 
demanded: 
I want hon. Gentlemen to t e l l me why the time 
has not a r r i v e d [for recognition] . At 
present moment, a large portion of our 
population are s u f f e r i n g i n consequence of 
the cotton famine. 
I b i d , p.181; Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, 
Volume 168, p.518; Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, 
Volume 169, pp.1728-1733. 
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p.1776. 
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A f t e r e s t a b l i s h i n g the f a c t that B r i t a i n was 
s u f f e r i n g due to the cotton shortage, the 
i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s then contended that B r i t a i n could 
a l l e v i a t e the d i s t r e s s by in t e r v e n i n g on behalf of the 
South because of the South's a g r i c u l t u r a l products. 
Lord Robert C e c i l on March 7, 1862 claimed: 
With respect to the Southern States, the case 
was e n t i r e l y reversed. Their population were 
an a g r i c u l t u r a l people. They furnished the 
raw m a t e r i a l of our industry, and they 
consumed the products which we manufactured 
from i t . ^ ^ 
I n the same debate, Gregory s t a t e d : 
I t i s a l l very w e l l to say that at t h i s 
moment the world i s flooded with the over-
production of past years; but I am given to 
understand there are orders coming i n , and 
there would be a demand from many p a r t s of 
the world i f the ports of the Southern States 
were open to our commerce. And not only 
that, but presuming that these ports were 
open, there are 8,000,000 Southerners anxious 
and ready to take our manufactures, which 
would not be kept out by a M o r i l l t a r i f f or 
. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 165, 
p.1229. 
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by d i f f e r e n t i a l duties upon our s h i p s . Can 
you wonder that the people of Lancashire and 
Yorks h i r e are turning t h e i r eyes i n that 
d i r e c t i o n ? Can you wonder they are anxious 
that these ports should be opened, when they 
b e l i e v e that i f they were open, the closed 
gates of the m i l l would be thrown wide open, 
and gladness and plenty and cheer would 
r e v i s i t many a cold and desolate hearth?''"^ 
Gregory, a few months l a t e r , on J u l y 18, 1862, 
again d i s c u s s e d the economic advantage of int e r v e n i n g 
on behalf of the South. He s t a t e d t h a t : 
The whole question of putting an end to t h i s 
s t a t e of things depends on our obtaining 
cotton. We know we cannot get that supply 
from I n d i a . We do know that we can get i t 
from the Southern St a t e s of America. 
L a t e r on during the same debate, he st a t e d : 
I contend, i f you wish to put an end to t h i s 
lamentable war, i f you wish at once to avert 
t h a t t e r r i b l e calamity which i s d a i l y 
. I b i d , p.1165. The M o r i l l T a r i f f to which Gregory 
r e f e r s was a p r o t e c t i v e t a r i f f against manufactured 
goods. The "over-production" to which Gregory r e f e r s 
was as a r e s u l t of the higher than usual harvest of the 
previous years as w e l l as the over-abundance of 
f i n i s h e d products. 
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i n c r e a s i n g throughout Lancashire, you w i l l 
accept the Resolution before you.^^ 
The r e s o l u t i o n to which he was r e f e r r i n g requested that 
the B r i t i s h Government o f f e r mediation to the North and 
the South. 
F i t z g e r a l d i n the same debate agreed with Gregory. 
He b e l i e v e d that the Members of Parliament "should be 
wanting i n our duty to our own population, as w e l l as 
humanity i n general" i f they f a i l e d to "step forward, 
and, by peaceful mediation, t r y and put an end to t h i s 
odious c o n t e s t . " ^ ^ 
And, f i n a l l y , the i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s , a f t e r s t a t i n g 
the the war had caused the cotton shortage which could 
be r e l i e v e d through i n t e r v e n t i o n , claimed that those 
who were s u f f e r i n g d i d not support n e u t r a l i t y . Yet 
they only mentioned t h i s on a few occassions as when 
Lindsay, i n 18 62, revealed that a workman, i n r e f e r r i n g 
to the r e c o g n i t i o n of the South, had t o l d him, " I can 
assure you i n t h i s part of the country we are anxious 
to see i t . " ^ ' ' Apparently, the i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s assumed 
th a t those s u f f e r i n g would be opposed to n e u t r a l i t y . 
To counter the i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s ' use of the cotton 
shortage, three points were used. F i r s t of a l l , the 
n e u t r a l i s t s a s s e r t e d that B r i t a i n should not act out of 
economic s e l f - i n t e r e s t . I n 1862, F o r s t e r stated, i n 
^5. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 168, 
pp.533, 566. 
I b i d , p,574. 
1"'. I b i d , p.518. 
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reference to those who were s u f f e r i n g , that B r i t a i n 
"ought not t r a n s g r e s s i n t e r n a t i o n a l law even for t h e i r 
i n t e r e s t s ' sake." The S o l i c i t o r General asked "how 
would i t have been i f , f o r the purpose of consulting 
and c o n s i d e r i n g our own i n t e r e s t s , we had been the 
f i r s t to break the recognised usages of e s t a b l i s h e d law 
- the f i r s t to say that the United States as a 
b e l l i g e r e n t power should not e x e r c i s e a l l b e l l i g e r e n t 
r i g h t s i n the ordinary manner, because we wanted 
cotton?"^^ 
Some of the n e u t r a l i s t s f u r t h e r claimed that the 
war r e s u l t i n g from i n t e r v e n t i o n would not be 
economically b e n e f i c i a l for B r i t a i n . On being asked by 
Hopwood on June 30, 1862, whether Her Majesty's 
Government "would endeavour to put an end to the C i v i l 
War i n America?", Palmerston r e p l i e d that "Her 
Majesty's Government are deeply s e n s i b l e of the 
s u f f e r i n g s now e x i s t i n g i n the cotton-manufacturing 
d i s t r i c t s " but he was "sure the House w i l l see that 
anything l i k e i n t e r f e r e n c e with the war now going one 
would only aggravate s t i l l more the s u f f e r i n g s of those 
now under p r i v a t i o n . " F o r s t e r , on J u l y 18, 1863, 
s t a t e d that "we could keep the working population of 
Lancashire i n luxury for l e s s than the p r i c e i t would 
cost us to i n t e r f e r e as the noble Lord opposite 
suggested." A d d i t i o n a l l y , he "believed that, 
considered i n a merely s e l f i s h and economical point of 
Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 165, 
pp.1195,1225. 
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view, such a war would be the worst a l t e r n a t i v e . " ^ ^ 
Lord Montagu, i n opposing i n t e r v e n t i o n for s e l f -
i n t e r e s t , claimed that war would r e s u l t and no cotton 
would be gained. On June 30, 1863, he asked h i s fellow 
members whether anyone b e l i e v e d "that the mere 
rec o g n i t i o n of the Southern States, without a war, 
would b r i n g over a s i n g l e bale of cotton? Or that 
r e c o g n i t i o n with war would lesson the hardship, 
diminish the taxes, or stop the e f f u s i o n of blood?"^^ 
The opponents of i n t e r v e n t i o n a l s o i n s i s t e d that 
those s u f f e r i n g i n t e r v e n t i o n supported n e u t r a l i t y , not 
i n t e r v e n t i o n . F o r s t e r s t a t e d t h a t : 
I do not mean to say that upon the f i r s t 
blush i t might not appear to be the i n t e r e s t 
of the manufacturing d i s t r i c t s that the 
blockade should be broken. But the 
manufacturing d i s t r i c t s do not themselves 
think so. They are opposed to the breaking 
of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law,*-^ 
In reference to the cotton m i l l workers' d e s i r e for 
i n t e r v e n t i o n , the S o l i c i t o r General s t a t e d : 
Who have been the great s u f f e r e r s here by the 
l o s s of that trade which has been so 
Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 168, p,536 
20. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 171, 
D 1787, 
21. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 165, 
p.1195. 
58 
unhappily i n t e r r u p t e d ? The a r t i s a n s and 
manufacturers of Lancashire... Have they 
demanded t h i s [ i n t e r v e n t i o n ] ? has my hon. 
Fri e n d , [Gregory] the Member f o r Galway 
spoken under t h e i r i n s p i r a t i o n ? No! 
On March 10, 1862, Taylor denied that the working 
c l a s s e s of B r i t a i n held the opinions of which the 
i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s had accused them. R e f e r r i n g to the 
workers at Blackburn who had been o r i g i n a l l y presented 
with a r e s o l u t i o n i n favour of recognition, he r e l a t e d 
t h a t "a Resolution s i m i l a r to that now proposed by the 
hon. Member f o r Sunderland [Lindsay] was submitted to 
them; i t was negatived, and a r e s o l u t i o n i n the 
opposite sense was c a r r i e d by the working men almost 
unanimously." Taylor reasoned that "these people were 
seen to bear t h e i r s u f f e r i n g s , because they f e l t , even 
i f a supply of cotton should be the r e s u l t of 
i n t e r v e n t i o n , that that i n t e r v e n t i o n would involve a 
s i n and produce a s t a i n on the a n t i - s l a v e r y f l a g of 
England."^3 
Within the second point, l a y the main point of 
contention concerning the cotton shortage: d i d those 
s u f f e r i n g support n e u t r a l i t y or i n t e r v e n t i o n ? This was 
an extremely d i f f i c u l t question for e i t h e r side to 
provide a d e f i n i t i v e answer and for that reason, i t 
made the cotton shortage a d i f f i c u l t i s s u e for the 
22 I b i d , p.1225. 
23, Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 168, p.525, 
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i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s to use. They could not advocate 
i n t e r v e n t i o n on behalf of those s u f f e r i n g i f those 
s u f f e r i n g d i d not themselves d e s i r e i t . Thus, despite 
the f a c t t h a t few of those a f f e c t e d could vote, t h e i r 
support was desperately sought by both s i d e s . This 
desperation was best manifested i n the staged r a l l i e s 
which both s i d e s h e l d i n order to demonstrate that the 
cotton m i l l workers supported e i t h e r North or South, 
Therefore, King Cotton had been dethroned by the 
u n c e r t a i n t y of p u b l i c opinion. 
Besides cotton, there was only one other i s s u e 
debated i n Parliament concerning the American C i v i l War 
which a l s o involved B r i t a i n ' s economic s e l f - i n t e r e s t : 
g r a i n . True, before the war, the g r a i n imports from 
the Northern s t a t e s were l e s s than one-quarter of the 
t o t a l imported i n t o B r i t a i n . However, from 1860 to 
1862 the American g r a i n imports surged to almost h a l f 
of the t o t a l g r a i n imports.2^ 
The g r a i n i s s u e though, was by f a r one of the 
l e a s t common debated. This was probably due to the 
f a c t t h a t i t was d i f f i c u l t to p e r c e i v e . One could 
e a s i l y be aware of blockading ships, s l a v e s , and 
unemployed cotton m i l l workers but B r i t a i n ' s dependence 
on g r a i n shipments was f a r l e s s n o t i c e a b l e . 
The g r a i n i s s u e , when mentioned, was used to 
oppose those advocating i n t e r f e r e n c e based upon the 
2*. David P, Crook, The North, the South, and the 
Powers (London: John Wiley, and Sons, 1974), pp,268-
272, 
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cotton shortage. The n e u t r a l i s t s contended that the 
B r i t i s h were dependent upon the grain which was being 
produced i n the North. I f war was to occur as the 
r e s u l t of i n t e r v e n t i o n , B r i t a i n would no longer receive 
t h i s g r a i n and there would be the p o s s i b i l i t y of a food 
shortage. To those considering whether to i n t e r f e r e , 
the n e u t r a l i s t s were hoping that the Members of 
Parliament would p r e f e r to cope with unemployment 
r a t h e r than s t a r v a t i o n . 
F o r s t e r was the member who most often discussed 
B r i t a i n ' s dependence upon American g r a i n . He f i r s t 
used the i s s u e during the debate of J u l y 18, 1862, when 
he s t a t e d that "We had a cotton famine now; but i f we 
d i d t h a t [ i n t e r v e n t i o n ] , we should stand i n danger of a 
corn famine."25 indeed, as already mentioned, nearly 
h a l f of B r i t a i n ' s g r a i n imports i n 1862 were from the 
North. 
F o r s t e r ' s b r i e f mention of g r a i n probably 
i n d i c a t e d that he d i d not b e l i e v e i n i t s powerful 
p e r s u a s i v e n e s s . I t was most l i k e l y used as a t a c t i c by 
which a debater uses numerous points i n the hope that 
the opposition w i l l be overwhelmed by the sheer 
quantity. 
The g r a i n i s s u e remained unmentioned a f t e r 
F o r s t e r ' s b r i e f comment for almost an e n t i r e year 
de s p i t e the s e v e r a l debates on i n t e r v e n t i o n during that 
time. The next and l a s t time that g r a i n was mentioned 
was the debate on Roebuck's motion on June 30, 1863. 
25, Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 165, p.550, 
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T h i s t i m e F o r s t e r would be j o i n e d by Montagu i n 
u s i n g t h e g r a i n i s s u e . Montagu argued: 
We i m p o r t e d l a r g e l y o f g r a i n , our two c h i e f 
sources b e i n g Poland and t h e N o r t h West 
St a t e s o f America. Was i t l i k e l y t h a t we 
s h o u l d be a b l e t o get much from Poland under 
t h e p r e s e n t circumstances? No. Then we must 
r e s t m a i n l y on t h e s u p p l i e s o f N o r t h America. 
But how would war a f f e c t t h a t ? Would not t h e 
d i s t r e s s i n England be aggravated by a war 
w i t h America?^^ 
To f u l l y comprehend Montagu's p o i n t , one must 
u n d e r s t a n d t h a t Poland was i n c r i s i s . The p o p u l a t i o n 
r e b e l l e d a g a i n s t Russian r u l e , p r i m a r i l y due t o a new 
c o n s c r i p t i o n p o l i c y , and t h e r e s u l t i n g g u e r r i l l a 
w a r f a r e by some o f t h e P o l i s h people j e o p a r d i z e d t h e 
p o s s i b l i t y t h a t B r i t a i n c o u l d c o n t i n u e t o a c q u i r e 
P o l i s h g r a i n d u r i n g 1863.^'' 
Tak i n g up Montagu's argument d u r i n g t h e same 
debate, F o r s t e r n o t e d t h a t " s u f f e r i n g s o f t h e 
countrymen... would be g r e a t indeed i f t h e y were 
d e p r i v e d o f t h e American c o r n crop o f t h i s year." 
F o r s t e r b l a t a n t l y c r i t i c i z e d Roebuck f o r he "would 
never a l l o w commercial c o n s i d e r a t i o n s p r e v e n t him from 
26. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 171, 
g. l 7 9 5 . 
2'. E. L l e w e l l y n Woodward, The Age of Reform, (Oxford; 
Clarendon Press, 1962) p.315. 
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engaging i n a j u s t war, but when t h e y were asked by t h e 
hon. and l e a r n e d Member f o r S h e f f i e l d t o go t o war f o r 
s e l f i s h purposes - t o p r o c u r e c o t t o n - i t was a l l o w a b l e 
t o ask 'What would be t h e co s t o f t h e war i n corn?"^^ 
The i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s never responded t o t h i s 
i s s u e . T h i s l a c k o f response was p r o b a b l y not because 
t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s c o n s i d e r e d i t i m p o s s i b l e t o 
c o u n t e r . Rather, t h e y p r o b a b l y s i m p l y c o n s i d e r e d t h e 
i s s u e o f l i t t l e i n f l u e n c e . 
Judging by t h e u n p o p u l a r i t y o f t h e c o t t o n and 
g r a i n i s s u e s r e l a t i v e t o t h e o t h e r i s s u e s , i t would 
appear t h a t t h e Members o f P a r l i a m e n t a p p a r e n t l y d i d 
not b e l i e v e t h a t t h e y c o u l d persuade t h e i r f e l l o w 
members t o i n t e r v e n e o r remain n e u t r a l s i m p l y on t h e 
b a s i s o f economic s e l f - i n t e r e s t . I n f a c t , from t h e 
p e r s p e c t i v e o f economic s e l f - i n t e r e s t , perhaps the best 
argument l a y i n t h e f a c t t h a t s e v e r a l B r i t i s h 
i n d u s t r i e s were t h r i v i n g i n t h e m a n u f a c t u r i n g o f 
s u p p l i e s f o r t h e N o r t h . Y e t , t h i s i s s u e was not 
mentioned i n any o f t h e P a r l i a m e n t a r y debates or the 
Cabinet d i s c u s s i o n s and t h e r e f o r e was not c o n s i d e r e d i n 
terms o f t h e n e u t r a l i t y p o l i c y . G r a i n , K i n g Cotton, 
and manufactured commodities c l e a r l y d i d not r e i g n i n 
t h e Houses of P a r l i a m e n t . 
28. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 171, 
B.1813. 
29. Owsley, p.549. 
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IV.The I s s u e s of Morality: 
S l a v e r y and Freedom 
"To th o s e who watched t h e pr o g r e s s o f events upon t he 
American c o n t i n e n t i t appeared a b s u r d l y unnecessary, 
nay, even p u e r i l e , t o s t a t e t h a t any o t h e r cause than 
s l a v e r y c o u l d be assigned f o r t h e c i v i l war." - W.E. 
F o r s t e r , October, 1861^ 
"The m a n i f e s t o s o f t h e South might be p u t f o r t h by any 
S t a t e d e s i r o u s o f t e r m i n a t i n g an unpleasant connexion 
or exchanging u n i o n f o r independence." - The Times, May 
30, 1861 
When d i s c u s s i n g t h e American C i v i l War, t h e 
Members o f P a r l i a m e n t debated two i s s u e s which may be 
c o n s i d e r e d i s s u e s o f m o r a l i t y : t h e r i g h t o f s e l f -
d e t e r m i n a t i o n , and s l a v e r y . The i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s 
advocated a d e p a r t u r e from n e u t r a l i t y based upon t he 
Southe r n e r s ' r i g h t o f s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n and th e y a l s o 
s t r i v e d t o d i s m i s s s l a v e r y as a c r u c i a l f a c t o r . The 
n e u t r a l i s t s c o u n t e r e d t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s ' d i s c u s s i o n 
o f t h e r i g h t o f s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n by i n s i s t i n g t h a t 
t h e South s t o o d f o r , and was f i g h t i n g f o r , t h e 
c o n t i n u a t i o n o f s l a v e r y . 
1. Quoted i n T.Wemyss Reid, The Life of W.E. Forster 
(London: Chapman and H a l l , 1888), p.339. 
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I n t h e e a r l y 1830s t h e a n t i s l a v e r y movement, as an 
o r g a n i z e d group, became a p o w e r f u l f o r c e i n B r i t a i n 
which e v e n t u a l l y a s s i s t e d i n a b o l i s h i n g s l a v e r y from 
t h e B r i t i s h Empire i n 1833 and, f o u r years l a t e r , t h e 
a n t i s l a v e r y movement l e d t h e crusade i n o r d e r t o 
a b o l i s h t h e s l a v e r y - a p p r e n t i c e s h i p system which was i n 
many ways j u s t s l a v e r y by a d i f f e r e n t name. Yet, a f t e r 
t h e z e n i t h o f t h e 1830s and t h e 1840s, t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n 
o f t h e a n t i s l a v e r y movement g r a d u a l l y d i m i n i s h e d , even 
though B r i t i s h s e n t i m e n t i n g e n e r a l remained h o s t i l e t o 
s l a v e r y . 
W i t h t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n o f t h e American C i v i l War 
and t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f s e v e r a l pro-Southern 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s such as t h e Southern Independence 
A s s o c i a t i o n , t h e a n t i s l a v e r y movement as an o r g a n i z e d 
f o r c e was t e m p o r a r i l y r e s u r r e c t e d . The a n t i s l a v e r y 
f o r c e s s u p p o r t e d t h e N o r t h and L i n c o l n ' s emancipation 
aims w h i l e opposing any d e v i a t i o n from B r i t a i n ' s 
n e u t r a l i t y p o l i c y . 
I n o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e p r o - N o r t h e r n view o f t h e 
a n t i s l a v e r y groups, t h e Southern sympathisers were not 
themselves i n f a v o u r o f s l a v e r y . Many of t h e p r o -
s o u t h e r n o r g a n i z a t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g t h e Southern 
Independence A s s o c i a t i o n , promised e m a n c i p a t i o n . ^ The 
i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t MP's, i n t e r e s t i n g l y , never mentioned 
t h a t f a c t b u t i n s t e a d went t o g r e a t l e n g t h s t o 
e s t a b l i s h t h a t s l a v e r y was not an i s s u e upon which 
2. Owsley, p.179, 
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B r i t a i n s h o u l d make p o l i c y i n r e s p e c t t o t h e 
Confederacy. 
F i r s t o f a l l , t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s contended t h a t 
t h e war was not a war f o r a b o l i t i o n . This was i n p a r t 
s u b s t a n t i a t e d by t h e t h e f a c t t h a t L i n c o l n had n o t , 
u n t i l t h e autumn o f 1862, made s l a v e r y a war aim. 
Lindsay used t h i s p o i n t t o s t r e n g t h e n h i s argument i n 
J u l y o f 1862 when he s t a t e d t h a t " s l a v e r y had v e r y 
l i t t l e i f a n y t h i n g t o do w i t h t h e c i v i l war." He 
p o i n t e d out t h a t : 
I n f a c t , P r e s i d e n t L i n c o l n , i n h i s i n a u g u r a l 
Address, on t h e 4 r t h o f March, 1861, s a i d -
' I have no i n t e n t i o n t o i n t e r f e r e , d i r e c t l y 
o r i n d i r e c t l y , w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n o f s l a v e r y 
where i t e x i s t s . I do not t h i n k I have a 
r i g h t t o do so l e g a l l y , and I am by no means 
i n c l i n e d t o do i t . 
P r i o r t o t h e issuance o f t h e Emancipation P r o c l a m a t i o n , 
L i n c o l n ' s d i s m i s s a l o f General Fremont f o r h i s 
e m a n c i p a t i o n e d i c t , h i s annulment of General Hunter's 
e m a n c i p a t i o n e d i c t , and h i s c o r r e c t i o n o f Cameron's 
stateme n t t h a t e m a n c i p a t i o n was a war aim made t h e t a s k 
more d i f f i c u l t f o r t h e a n t i s l a v e r y groups. Lindsay 
used t h i s l i n e o f argument by r e c a l l i n g t h a t much "had 
been s a i d about s l a v e r y , and he c o u l d be no f r i e n d t o 
s l a v e r y as an i n s t i t u t i o n ; b u t when two o f t h e most 
d i s t i n g u i s h e d f e d e r a l g e n e r a l s t a l k e d about l i b e r a t i n g 
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t h e s l a v e s , t h e y were i m m e d i a t e l y r e c a l l e d . " ^ Lindsay 
was m i s t a k e n f o r o n l y General Fremont had been 
" r e c a l l e d " a l t h o u g h General Hunter's emancipation e d i c t 
had been revoked. N e v e r t h e l e s s , he was c o r r e c t i n 
b e l i e v i n g t h a t L i n c o l n had n o t , as o f March 1862, 
d e c l a r e d t h a t t h e war was a war a g a i n s t s l a v e r y . 
The i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s d i d admit t h a t s l a v e r y 
e x i s t e d i n t h e South b u t a l s o argued t h a t t h a t was no 
reason not t o r e c o g n i z e t h e Confederacy f o r B r i t a i n 
r e c o g n i z e d s e v e r a l s t a t e s t h a t p e r m i t t e d s l a v e r y . 
D u r i n g h i s speech on June 30, 1863, Roebuck argued: 
We are met by t h e a s s e r t i o n , 'Oh, England 
cannot acknowledge a S t a t e i n which s l a v e r y 
e x i s t s . ' Indeed, I ask, i s t h a t r e a l l y t he 
case, and i s any man so weak as t o b e l i e v e 
i t ? Have we not acknowledged B r a z i l ? Are we 
not i n c o n s t a n t communication w i t h Russia? 
And i s t h e r e not s l a v e r y i n b o t h these 
c o u n t r i e s ? ^ 
F urthermore, t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s a s s e r t e d t h a t 
t h e s l a v e r y system i n t h e South was more c i v i l i z e d t han 
t h e manner i n which b l a c k s were t r e a t e d i n t h e N o r t h . 
B e n t i n c k , i n 1862, contended t h a t "the N o r t h e r n and 
Southern S t a t e s s t o o d i n p r e c i s e l y t h e same p o s i t i o n i n 
^. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 168, p.515. 
^. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 171, p.1774 
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regards t o t h i s i n s t i t u t i o n . " ^ I n 1863, Roebuck 
s t a t e d : 
Moreover, does anybody b e l i e v e t h a t t h e b l a c k 
s l a v e would be a t a l l improved i n h i s 
c o n d i t i o n by b e i n g p l a c e d i n t h e same 
p o s i t i o n as t h e f r e e b l a c k i n t h e North? I 
ask whether t h e N o r t h , h a t i n g s l a v e r y , i f you 
w i l l , does not h a t e t h e s l a v e s t i l l more? 
Thi s l a s t comment e l i c i t e d t h e response o f a few 
"Noes!" which were subse q u e n t l y drowned i n cheers. He 
i n s i s t e d t h a t t h e " b l a c k s are not p e r m i t t e d equal 
s t a t i o n i n t h e N o r t h . " I n c o n t r a s t , he argued " i n t h e 
South t h e f e e l i n g i s v e r y d i f f e r e n t , " f o r t h e r e "black 
c h i l d r e n and w h i t e c h i l d r e n are brought up t o g e t h e r " t o 
which a "No!" was shouted. He c o n t i n u e d by n o t i n g t h a t 
" I n t h e South t h e r e i s not t h a t h a t r e d , t h a t contempt 
o f t h e b l a c k man which e x i s t s i n t h e N o r t h . " Roebuck 
s t a t e d t h a t he was not "speaking i n f a v o u r o f s l a v e r y " 
b u t " a l t h o u g h I hate s l a v e r y , I cannot h e l p seeing t h e 
g r e a t d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e c o n d i t i o n o f t h e b l a c k i n 
t h e N o r t h , and h i s c o n d i t i o n s i n t h e South." He 
f u r t h e r b e l i e v e d t h a t "to-morrow t h e N o r t h would j o i n 
w i t h t h e South, and f a s t e n s l a v e r y on t h e necks o f 
b l a c k s , i f t h e South would o n l y r e - e n t e r t h e Union. 
^. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 165, p.1181. 
^. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 171, 
pp.1774-1775. 
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C l i f f o r d , i n t h e same debate, c l a i m e d t h a t s l a v e r y 
i n t h e South was not c r u e l o r t h a t t h e N o r t h was not 
a g a i n s t s l a v e r y . He confessed t h a t he " d i d not wish i t 
t o be supposed t h a t he was a t a l l i n f a v o u r o f t h e 
i n s t i t u t i o n o f s l a v e r y , f o r he th o u g h t i t e q u a l l y 
d e g r a d i n g t o t h e master and t h e s l a v e ; b u t he d i d not 
b e l i e v e t h a t t h e m a j o r i t y o f t h e Southern masters were 
c r u e l masters." He i n d i c t e d "the whole power of t h e 
N o r t h " f o r b e i n g "engaged t o support t h e system."'' 
For those who remained unconvinced, t h e 
i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s f u r t h e r c l a i m e d t h a t s e p a r a t i o n o f t h e 
U n i t e d S t a t e s i n t o two separate r e p u b l i c s would c u r t a i l 
s l a v e r y . Gregory contended t h a t " r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e 
Union was t h e cir c u m s t a n c e most l i k e l y t o l e a d t o the 
s t r e n g t h e n i n g o f t h e one ( s l a v e r y ) and t h e spread o f 
t h e o t h e r ( s l a v e t r a d e ) . " L o rd Campbell on March 23, 
1863, a s s e r t e d t h a t i n "the event o f s e p a r a t i o n , t h e r e 
w i l l no l o n g e r be t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f e x t e n d i n g negro 
bondage i n t o t e r r i t o r i e s i n which i t does not now 
e x i s t . " A c c o r d i n g t h i s l i n e o f argument which even 
W i l l i a m L l o y d G a r r i s o n o r i g i n a l l y accepted, t h e 
sec e s s i o n o f t h e s l a v e s t a t e s would p r e v e n t t h e 
e x t e n s i o n o f s l a v e r y i n t o t h e western t e r r i t o r i e s . 
However, i f t h e s l a v e s t a t e s remained p a r t o f t h e 
Union, s l a v e r y would be spread from ocean t o ocean.^ 
7. I b i d , pp.1798-1799. 
^. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 165, p.1161; 
Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 169, p.1730; I t 
s h o u l d be n o t e d t h a t f o r a t i m e , t h e New Mexico 
t e r r i t o r y had a s e c e s s i o n i s t government. 
69 
I n f e r v e n t o p p o s i t i o n , t h e n e u t r a l i s t s c o n t i n u a l l y 
s t r e s s e d t h e f a c t t h a t t h e Confederacy s t o o d f o r 
s l a v e r y . I n 1862, t h e S o l i c i t o r General d e c l a r e d t h a t 
" a f t e r h a v i n g made such s a c r i f i c e s as we have done f o r 
t h e sake o f l i b e r t y " B r i t a i n s h o u l d not engage i n 
" a c t i v e c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h a c o u n t r y which, perhaps, 
w i t h o u t t h e f a u l t o f t h e p r e s e n t g e n e r a t i o n , i s s t i l l 
one o f t h e l a s t s t r o n g h o l d s o f s l a v e r y . " P.A. T a y l o r , 
who contended t h a t s l a v e r y i n t h e South "might be 
d e s c r i b e d as t h e wi c k e d e s t and most i n f e r n a l system the 
w o r l d had ever seen, " l i k e t h e S o l i c i t o r General s t a t e d 
t h a t "What an e x t r a o r d i n a r y i n s t a n c e o f i n c o n s i s t e n c y 
t o see a n a t i o n t h a t expended £20,000,000 i n o r d e r t o 
emancipate t h e sl a v e s i n i t s own c o l o n i e s , now 
d i s c u s s i n g i n P a r l i a m e n t a p r o p o s i t i o n f o r t h e 
e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f t h e independence o f new St a t e s whose 
independence was e x c l u s i v e l y based on t h e r e c o g n i t i o n 
o f s l a v e r y , " W.E. F o r s t e r s t a t e d t h a t he " b e l i e v e d i t 
was g e n e r a l l y acknowledged t h a t s l a v e r y was t h e r e a l 
cause o f t h i s war," t o which t h e r e were shouts o f "No!, 
No!" and " t h e t a r i f f . " He c o n t i n u e d by n o t i n g t h a t 
"Vice P r e s i d e n t Stephens s a i d t h a t t h e South went t o 
war t o e s t a b l i s h s l a v e r y as t h e c o r n e r - s t o n e o f t h e new 
R e p u b l i c , " w h i l e t h e r e was "no a l l u s i o n t o t a r i f f i n 
t h e e l e c t i o n o r d e c l a r a t i o n o f independence by t h e 
Southern Confederacy."^ 
^. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 165, p.1224; 
Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 168, 
pp.527,537. 
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I n t h e autumn o f 18 62, Abraham L i n c o l n made a 
d r a m a t i c s t e p which a l t e r e d t h e focus o f t h e war. 
A f t e r t h e Union v i c t o r y a t t h e b a t t l e o f An t i e t a m , he 
i s s u e d h i s famous p r e l i m i n a r y Emancipation P r o c l a m a t i o n 
which d e c l a r e d t h a t a f t e r January 1, 1863, a l l t h e 
s l a v e s i n those s t a t e s which were i n r e b e l l i o n would be 
f r e e . L i n c o l n c o n s i d e r e d t h e p r o c l a m a t i o n one o f h i s 
g r e a t e s t achievements. 
The p r o c l a m a t i o n was n o t a p a r t i c u l a r l y p o p u l a r 
i s s u e f o r e i t h e r t h e n e u t r a l i s t s or t h e 
i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s . I t was not mentioned i n P a r l i a m e n t 
u n t i l almost s i x months a f t e r L i n c o l n had f i r s t read 
i t . However, when t h e Southern sympathisers mentioned 
i t , t h e y proceeded t o c r i t i c i z e i t i n t e n s e l y . 
L o r d Campbell on March, 23, 1863, i n moving t o the 
i s s u e o f s l a v e r y , became t h e f i r s t Member i n Par l i a m e n t 
t o mention t h e Emancipation P r o c l a m a t i o n . He cl a i m e d 
t h a t : 
At one t i m e t h e y [ t h e N o r t h ] boasted o f t h e i r 
d i s p o s i t i o n t o m a i n t a i n i t [ s l a v e r y ] . Soon 
a f t e r , t h e y d e s i r e d t h e Border S t a t e s t o be 
d e l i v e r e d from i t . A f t e r t h a t emancipation 
was d e c l a r e d , b u t o n l y i n t h e S t a t e s which 
The Emancipation P r o c l a m a t i o n d i d not a l t e r 
Palmerston's views o f t h e war. Chamberlain, p.115. 
Douglas L o r i m e r c l a i m e d , i n r e f e r e n c e t o t h e e f f e c t o f 
th e E mancipation P r o c l a m a t i o n , t h a t " L i b e r a l o p i n i o n , 
a l r e a d y fragmented over t h e q u e s t i o n o f support f o r t h e 
South or t h e N o r t h , d i d not f i n d t h a t t h e Emancipation 
P r o c l a m a t i o n c l a r i f i e d t h e i s s u e . " Douglas Lorimer, 
Colour, Class, and the Victorians ( L e i c e s t e r , 1978), 
p.169. 
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were r e s i s t i n g them. The l o y a l r e g i o n must 
p r e s e r v e t h e i n s t i t u t i o n - b u t seceders must 
renounce i t . 
He b e l i e v e d t h a t " s w e l d i n g w i t h omnipotence, Mr. 
L i n c o l n and h i s c o l l e a g u e s d i c t a t e i n s u r r e c t i o n t o t h e 
sl a v e s o f Alabama."^^ 
D u r i n g t h e d i s c u s s i o n on Roebuck's motion, b o t h 
C l i f f o r d and Gladstone d e c l a r e d t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n t o 
r e c o g n i z i n g t h e Confederacy, Yet t h e y t o o d i s p l a y e d 
t h e i r Southern sympathies i n c r i t i c i s i n g t h e 
Emancipation P r o c l a m a t i o n . C l i f f o r d a s s e r t e d t h a t even 
"Mr. L i n c o l n ' s p r o c l a m a t i o n was a d m i t t e d t o be an 
i l l e g a l a c t , and t o be j u s t i f i e d o n l y as a war 
measure." Gladstone d i d not " b e l i e v e t h a t a more f a t a l 
e r r o r was ever committed t h a n when men ... came t o t h e 
c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e emancipation o f t h e negro race was 
t o be sought, a l t h o u g h t h e y c o u l d o n l y t r a v e l t o i t by 
a sea o f blood."^2 s i m i l a r l y . L o rd Robert C e c i l , who 
was t h e o n l y one t o speak i n f a v o u r o f Roebuck's 
mo t i o n , a l s o s t a t e d h i s o p p o s i t i o n t o L i n c o l n ' s 
e m a n c i p a t i o n e d i c t . He n o t e d t h a t : 
I n almost every case i t [ s l a v e r y ] had been 
g r a d u a l l y r o o t e d o u t ; but never i n 
consequence o f t h e pr e s s u r e o f armed f o r c e . 
Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 169, 
p 1222. 
^2. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 171, 
pp.1799, 1807. 
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I t was e r a d i c a t e d i n every i n s t a n c e by t h e 
i n f l u e n c e o f p u b l i c o p i n i o n . 
D e s p i t e t h e a b o l i t i o n i s t n a t u r e o f t h e 
Emancipation P r o c l a m a t i o n , o n l y one member of 
P a r l i a m e n t ever used i t as a major p o i n t t o b o l s t e r t he 
n e u t r a l i s t argument. That member was John B r i g h t . On 
June 30, 1863, he c h a s t i s e d t h e House f o r he had "not 
heard a word t o - n i g h t o f another q u e s t i o n - I mean t h e 
p r o c l a m a t i o n o f t h e P r e s i d e n t o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . " 
He a t t a c k e d Roebuck f o r h i s apparent ignorance o f t h i s 
document: 
I make no allowance f o r t h a t , because i f he 
i s i g n o r a n t , i t i s h i s own f a u l t , f o r God has 
g i v e n him an i n t e l l e c t which ought t o keep 
him from ignorance on a q u e s t i o n o f t h i s 
magnitude. 
He c o n t i n u e d : 
We have our Consuls i n t h e South, b u t 
r e c o g n i s i n g o n l y one l e g i s l a t u r e , one 
P r e s i d e n t , one law. So f a r as we are 
concerned, t h a t p r o c l a m a t i o n i s a l e g a l and 
e f f e c t i v e document. 
Furthermore, he s t a t e d : 
I b i d , p.1819 
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We see t h a t t h e Government o f t h e U n i t e d 
S t a t e s has f o r two years p a s t been co n t e n d i n g 
f o r i t s l i f e , and we know t h a t i t i s 
c o n t e n d i n g n e c e s s a r i l y f o r human freedom. 
That Government a f f o r d s t h e remarkable 
example - o f f e r e d p r o b a b l y f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e 
i n t h e h i s t o r y o f t h e w o r l d - of a g r e a t 
Government coming f o r w a r d as t h e o r g a n i z e d 
defender o f law, freedom, and e q u a l i t y . 
T h i s l a s t comment r e c e i v e d an "Oh!" and cheers from t he 
assembly. 
However, w h i l e o n l y B r i g h t mentioned t h e 
Emancipation P r o c l a m a t i o n , L i n c o l n ' s document a l l o w e d 
F o r s t e r and B r i g h t t o c l a i m t h a t t h e Confederacy stood 
f o r s l a v e r y and t h e Union s t o o d f o r emancipation. I n 
18 63, F o r s t e r i n q u i r e d "How was t h e l i n e drawn between 
t h e two s e t s o f s t a t e s ? " and he answered e x p l i c i t l y 
t h a t t h e l i n e was drawn " E x a c t l y by s l a v e r y , not t h e 
p r o t e c t i v e t a r i f f . " F o r s t e r a s s e r t e d t h a t "they [ t h e 
N o r t h ] were g i v i n g up s l a v e r y " and: 
The Government o f t h i s c o u n t r y were now 
c a l l e d on t o do something, which i f i t meant 
a n y t h i n g , meant i n t e r v e n t i o n . ['No!' 'Hear!] 
1^. I b i d , pp.1835-1836. The Times had a s l i g h t l y 
d i f f e r e n t r e p o r t t h a n Hansard's. I t cl a i m e d t h a t 
B r i g h t ' s l a s t comment r e c e i v e d n o t j u s t one "Oh!", but 
s e v e r a l . 
74 
He f e l t g r e a t a n x i e t y f o r t h e success o f t h e 
siege o f V i c k s b u r g , f o r he b e l i e v e d two 
t h i n g s depended on i t - peace and freedom. 
He c o u l d not h e l p t h i n k i n g t h a t i f V i c k s b u r g 
were t a k e n , and t h e o t h e r s i d e o f t h e 
M i s s i s s i p p i c u t o f f from s l a v e t e r r i t o r y , we 
s h o u l d see an end o f t h e war.^^ 
To F o r s t e r , t h e f a l l o f V i c k s b u r g and t h e success of 
t h e N o r t h would t h e n p r e v e n t a f u r t h e r spread o f 
s l a v e r y . 
B r i g h t b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e r e was no q u e s t i o n t h a t 
t h e s t a t e s had d i v i d e d due t o t h e South's " p e c u l i a r 
i n s t i t u t i o n . " He a s s e r t e d t h a t Roebuck "would throw 
t h e w e i g h t o f England i n t o t h e s c a l e i n f a v o u r o f t h e 
cause o f s l a v e r y , " w h i l e B r i g h t m a i n t a i n e d " t h a t the 
war t h a t i s now r a g i n g i n America i s more l i k e l y t o 
a b o l i s h i t t h a n n o t . " The c o t t o n m i l l owner qu e s t i o n e d 
whether t h e r e was "any Gentleman i n t h i s House who w i l l 
n o t agree w i t h me i n t h i s - t h a t i t would be f a r b e t t e r 
f o r our g r e a t L a n c a s h i r e i n d u s t r y t h a t our supply of 
c o t t o n s h o u l d be grown by f r e e l a b o u r r a t h e r than by 
s l a v e l a b o u r ? " He appealed t o t h e House t o "consider 
what t h e s t a t e o f t h i n g s [were] b e f o r e t h e war" when 
"every year i n t h e s l a v e S t a t e s o f America t h e r e were 
150,000 c h i l d r e n b o r n i n t o t h e w o r l d - born w i t h t h e 
badge and loom o f s l a v e r y . " ^ ^ 
15. I b i d , p.1816. 
1^. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 171, 
pp.1830-1834. 
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The p r i m a r y way t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s countered t h e 
s l a v e r y i s s u e was t h r o u g h by t h e use o f t h e r i g h t of 
s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . The r i g h t o f s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , 
p u t s i m p l y , was a b e l i e f t h a t people s h o u l d be f r e e t o 
choose t h e government which governs them. By 
d e s c r i b i n g t h e war as one which was caused by N o r t h e r n -
imposed t a r i f f s or one t h a t was caused by t h e g r a d u a l 
l o s s o f Southern p o l i t i c a l power, t h e Southern 
sympathisers c o u l d press t h e c l a i m t h a t t h e South had a 
r i g h t t o secede and a r i g h t t o r e b e l . 
I n t h e debate of March 18 62 i n t h e House of 
Commons, f o u r o f t h e Southern sympathisers - Gregory, 
B e n t i n c k , L indsay and C e c i l - used t h e t h e r i g h t o f 
s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o b o l s t e r t h e i r argument i n f a v o u r 
o f t h e South. Gregory confessed t h a t h i s "sympathies 
were w i t h one p o r t i o n o f t h e American people - not t h a t 
p o r t i o n t h a t i s f i g h t i n g f o r empire, b u t w i t h t h a t 
p o r t i o n t h a t i s s t r u g g l i n g f o r independence." He 
contended t h a t " secession was a r i g h t , t h a t s e p a r a t i o n 
i s a f a c t , and t h a t r e c o n s t r u c t i o n i s an 
i m p o s s i b i l i t y . " I n a h i s t o r i c a l view, B e n t i n c k 
s u p p o r t e d Gregory i n h i s c l a i m t h a t t h e T h i r t e e n 
C o l o n i e s had r e b e l l e d a g a i n s t B r i t a i n because o f 
" t a x a t i o n " and t h a t "was e x a c t l y what t h e Southern 
S t a t e s were d o i n g now i n r e s p e c t t o t h e N o r t h . " 
L i ndsay d e c l a r e d t h a t i f "the Americans o f 1784 had a 
r i g h t t o r e b e l a g a i n s t t h e mother c o u n t r y , s u r e l y t h e 
Southern S t a t e s had a s t i l l g r e a t e r r i g h t t o f r e e 
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themselves from merely F e d e r a l o b l i g a t i o n s t o t h e 
N o r t h e r n S t a t e s . "^ '^  
Of t h e f o u r who spoke on s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , o n l y 
C e c i l used B r i t a i n ' s r e c o g n i t i o n o f past r e b e l l i o n s t o 
s t r e n g t h e n h i s argument. He r e c a l l e d t h a t t h e " E n g l i s h 
Government had always been prone t o recog n i s e 
i n s u r r e c t i o n a r y Powers" and t h a t h i s n a t i o n ' s 
" p r i n c i p l e " had always been " t h a t t h e people should 
choose t h e i r own gov e r n o r s , and t h a t when t h e w i l l o f 
th e people was c l e a r l y pronounced t h e assent o f f o r e i g n 
Governments s h o u l d f o l l o w . " He m a i n t a i n e d t h a t B r i t a i n 
"had always r e c o g n i z e d S t a t e s as soon as an independent 
Government was e s t a b l i s h e d w i t h i n t h e i r b o r d e r s . " 
C e c i l c i t e d t h e B r i t i s h r e c o g n i t i o n o f Belgium, Greece, 
I t a l y , and t h e Spanish c o l o n i e s o f South America as 
h i s t o r i c a l examples i n t h e l a s t f i f t y y e a r s . Despite 
these p a s t a c t i o n s , he b e l i e v e d t h a t "the f i r s t 
i n s t a n c e i n which t h e y had d e p a r t e d from t h a t p r i n c i p l e 
was i n t h e case o f t h e Confederate S t a t e s o f 
America."^^ 
The r i g h t o f s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n became an 
e s p e c i a l l y p o p u l a r i s s u e w i t h t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s as 
t h e South d i s p l a y e d i t s a b i l i t y t o form and s u r v i v e as 
t h e Confederate S t a t e s o f America. The d u r a b i l i t y o f 
t h e Confederacy beyond t h e n i n e t y day e x p e c t a t i o n was 
h e l d t o j u s t i f y i t s c l a i m t o t h e r i g h t o f s e l f -
d e t e r m i n a t i o n . I n J u l y 1862 Vane Tempest p o i n t e d l y 
. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 165, 
pg.1160, 1182, 1207. 
I b i d , pp.1228-1229. 
77 
q u e s t i o n e d "what were t h e chances t h a t t h e N o r t h would 
r e s t o r e t h e Union?" He b e l i e v e d t h e chances s l i m , f o r 
t h e South " a f t e r an i n t e r v a l o f s i x t e e n months" had 
" g a l l a n t l y h e l d t h e i r own." W h i t e s i d e s t a t e d t h a t " I t 
t h e r e f o r e becomes a m a t t e r o f f a c t whether t h e seceding 
s t a t e s have e s t a b l i s h e d a Government, and have shown a 
power and d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o r e s i s t any f o r c e t h a t can be 
b r o u g h t a g a i n s t them; and, i f so, whether t h e r e i s any 
ground t o b e l i e v e t h a t a t any t i m e t h a t can be named 
th e N o r t h w i l l be a b l e t o s u b j u g a t e t h e South." 
Lindsay c l a i m e d t h a t " r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e Southern 
S t a t e s on t h e p a r t o f t h i s c o u n t r y would be p e r f e c t l y 
j u s t i f i a b l e " f o r t h e South c o u l d n e i t h e r be "conquered" 
or "brought back i n t o t h e Union." Lindsay b e l i e v e d 
"th e t i m e had a r r i v e d when t h e Southern S t a t e s should 
be r e c e i v e d i n t o t h e f a m i l y o f n a t i o n s . " Gregory, who 
b e l i e v e d t h a t i t was " p e r f e c t l y c l e a r t h a t t h e Southern 
Confederacy" was " o f one mind and o f one h e a r t , " 
t h o u g h t t h e " R e s o l u t i o n s of t h e hon. Member (Mr. 
Lindsay) and my noble F r i e n d (Lord A.V. Tempest) are 
r i g h t l y worded i n c a l l i n g on t h e Government t o u n i t e 
w i t h t h e o t h e r European Powers i n a j o i n t and immediate 
course o f a c t i o n i n t h i s g r e a t emergency," f o r "we are 
j u s t i f i e d i n r e c o g n i s i n g t h e Confederate S t a t e s as a 
Sovereign R e p u b l i c ; t h a t t h e y have every element 
c o n s t i t u t i n g a de f a c t o Government." F i t z g e r a l d 
a l l e g e d t h a t "the Confederate S t a t e s had m a i n t a i n e d not 
o n l y a Government p e r f e c t l y d i s t i n c t from t h a t from 
which t h e y had s e p a r a t e d themselves, b u t an e s t a b l i s h e d 
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Government, w i t h a r e c o g n i s e d c o n s t i t u t i o n , a 
P r e s i d e n t , a Senate, and House o f R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , d u l y 
e l e c t e d , c o n s t i t u e n c i e s who e x e r c i s e d an independent 
c h o i c e , and e l e c t i o n s f r e e l y conducted."^® 
I n a n o t h e r debate o f March, 1862, t h e r i g h t o f 
s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n f o r t h e Southern people was used t o 
b o l s t e r t h e arguments of t h r e e o f t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t 
MPs. B o r r o w i n g a phrase from American h i s t o r y , Lindsay 
concluded t h a t " t he r e a l cause o f t h i s d i s r u p t i o n was 
t a x a t i o n w i t h o u t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . " W h i t e s i d e s t a t e d 
t h a t t h e " l o s s o f power may have been an i m p o r t a n t 
element i n t h e d i s p u t e . " Gregory f a i l e d t o view 
s l a v e r y as a f a c t o r , d e s c r i b i n g t h e war i n s t e a d as "a 
war f o r independence on t h e one s i d e , and f o r vengeance 
on t h e o t h e r . " 
I n o p p o s i t i o n , o n l y one n e u t r a l i s t d i r e c t l y 
responded t o t h i s l i n e o f argument. F o r s t e r m a i n t a i n e d 
t h a t t h e South was " f i g h t i n g i n o r d e r t o make 
themselves an independent n a t i o n , and i n ord e r t o 
d e s t r o y t h e Union" w h i l e t h e "Federals were f i g h t i n g i n 
o r d e r t o m a i n t a i n t h e Union." F o r s t e r then drew an 
i n t e r e s t i n g p a r a l l e l by n o t i n g t h a t " i f any d i s t u r b a n c e 
arose i n I r e l a n d , i f a c o n t e s t were g o i n g on t h e r e , and 
i f a n other Power stepped i n , s a y i n g t o us, 'Let t h e 
I r i s h m e n a l o n e , and l e t them govern themselves, should 
we be p r e p a r e d t o submit t o d i c t a t i o n i n such a 
Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 168, pp. 
530, 542, 511-512, 544, 574. 
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m a t t e r ? " F o r s t e r w e l l knew t h e B r i t i s h would h a r d l y 
submit t o i n t e r v e n t i o n o f t h a t n a t u r e . 
The argument p r e s s i n g f o r i n t e r v e n t i o n based upon 
t h e r i g h t o f s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n was so p o w e r f u l t h a t i t 
persuaded a member o f t h e government: W i l l i a m E. 
Gladstone. He began t o q u e s t i o n n e u t r a l i t y not out of 
a p a r t i c u l a r fondness f o r t h e South nor a h a t r e d o f t h e 
N o r t h , b u t out o f a p o l i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y t h a t would 
l a t e r a l s o cause him t o support I r i s h Home Rule and t h e 
independence o f t h e Balkan S t a t e s . D e s p i t e h i s 
vehement d i s d a i n o f s l a v e r y , he m a i n t a i n e d , t h r o u g h o u t 
t h e e n t i r e c o n f l i c t , t h a t t h e Southern people had a 
r i g h t t o determine t h e i r own form o f government. I n 
t h e autumn o f 1862, Gladstone b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e time 
was r i g h t f o r m e d i a t i o n and he went p u b l i c w i t h h i s 
views i n t h e most d r a m a t i c o f ways by s t r e s s i n g t h e 
d u r a b i l i t y and t h e t e n a c i t y o f t h e South. At h i s 
Newcastle speech on October 11, he d e c l a r e d : 
We know q u i t e w e l l t h a t t h e people o f the 
N o r t h e r n S t a t e s have n o t y e t drunk o f t h e cup 
- t h e y a r e s t i l l t r y i n g t o h o l d i t f a r from 
t h e i r l i p s - which a l l t h e r e s t o f t h e w o r l d 
see t h e y n e v e r t h e l e s s must d r i n k o f . We may 
have our own o p i n i o n s about s l a v e r y ; we may 
be f o r o r a g a i n s t t h e South; b u t t h e r e i s no 
20, I t s h o u l d be n o t e d t h a t F o r s t e r spoke a f t e r 
Gregory, and h i s example of I r e l a n d was e s p e c i a l l y 
r e l e v a n t t o Gregory who was a Member o f P a r l i a m e n t 
r e p r e s e n t i n g an I r i s h c o n s t i t u e n c y . 
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doubt t h a t J e f f e r s o n Davis and o t h e r l e a d e r s 
o f t h e South have made an army; t h e y are 
making, i t appears, a navy, and t h e y have 
made what i s more t h a n e i t h e r - t h e y have 
made a n a t i o n ! ' I 21 
By November, 1862, Gladstone b e l i e v e d t h a t these 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s were c a u s i n g p u b l i c o p i n i o n t o swing i n 
f a v o u r o f t h e Confederacy. I n h i s Cabinet memorandum, 
he w r o t e : 
Another reason which seems t o me t o t e l l 
m a t e r i a l l y i n f a v o u r o f e a r l y a c t i o n i s t h i s , 
t h a t t h e p e o p l e o f England are b e i n g r a p i d l y 
drawn i n t o Southern sympathies. 
I t i s one t h i n g t o a n t i c i p a t e an is s u e 
of t h e war f a v o u r a b l e i n t h e main t o t h e 
Southern view: i t i s q u i t e another t o 
sympathize w i t h men whose cause i s , as I 
t h i n k , s e r i o u s l y t a i n t e d by i t s c o n n e c t i o n 
w i t h s l a v e r y . Yet t h e s i g h t o f a m i n o r i t y , 
h e r o i c a l l y s t r u g g l i n g a g a i n s t t h e e f f o r t o f a 
much l a r g e r number t o p l a c e them i n a 
p o l i t i c a l c o n n e c t i o n t h a t t h e y abhor, 
p r o b a b l y w i t h a w i t h d r a w a l or l i m i t a t i o n o f 
t h e i r r i g h t s as freemen, has an i r r e s i s t i b l e 
tendency t o arouse a c t i v e sympathies i n 
England on b e h a l f o f t h e weaker s i d e , even 
21. Matthew, p.152. 
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a p a r t from t h e d i s g r a c e f u l circumstances 
which have a t t e n d e d t h e f o r c i b l e r e -
e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f t h e N o r t h e r n r u l e , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n New Orleans. 
The more these p o s i t i v e Southern 
sympathies i n c r e a s e , t h e l e s s s h a l l we be 
a b l e t o m a i n t a i n a f r i e n d l y and i m p a r t i a l 
aspect i n any p r o c e e d i n g t h a t may be t a k e n . 
But p u b l i c o p i n i o n , not y e t t o o w i d e l y 
committed f o r t h e South, appears t o me t o be 
i n t h a t s t a t e i n which i t would h a i l w i t h 
c o r d i a l s a t i s f a c t i o n any j u d i c i o u s e f f o r t f o r 
t h e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e war. 
I n one p a r t i c u l a r paragraph, Gladstone c l e a r l y 
showed t h a t i n t h e case o f t h e American C i v i l War, he 
emphasized t h e r i g h t o f s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n more than 
s l a v e r y f o r he d i d not b e l i e v e t h a t s l a v e r y c o u l d be 
e x t e r m i n a t e d by war. He w r o t e : 
One c o n c l u d i n g word on s l a v e r y . I 
cannot suppose t h a t we are t o r e f u s e t o cure, 
o r t o aim a t c u r i n g , one enormous e v i l , 
because we cannot cure another a l o n g w i t h i t . 
But I f e e l i t would be most d e s i r a b l e , i n a 
process o f i n t e r f e r e n c e by which t h e South 
would be o s t e n s i b l y , though perhaps not 
r e a l l y , t h e g r e a t e s t g a i n e r , t o use every 
moral i n f l u e n c e w i t h a view o f m i t i g a t i o n , 
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o r , i f p o s s i b l e , t h e removal of s l a v e r y . But 
i f we are r i g h t i n a n t i c i p a t i n g , as most of 
us seem t o a n t i c i p a t e , t h a t t h e course of the 
war from month t o month, and year t o year, 
w i l l , on t h e whole, b r i n g t h e South nearer 
and n e a r e r t o an independence achieved by i t s 
own d a r i n g and t e n a c i t y , t h e n i t i s p l a i n 
t h a t t h e l o n g e r i n t e r f e r e n c e i s delayed, t h e 
l e s s f a v o u r a b l e w i l l be our p o s i t i o n , and t h e 
l e s s c l e a r our t i t l e , f o r u r g i n g on t h e 
Government o f t h e Southern Confederacy t h e 
j u s t c l a i m s o f t h e s l a v e . 
The d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e Roebuck motion, t h e l a s t 
t i m e t h e n e u t r a l i t y p o l i c y was d i s c u s s e d i n P a r l i a m e n t , 
p r o v i d e d an e l a b o r a t i o n on t h e r i g h t o f s e l f -
d e t e r m i n a t i o n by Roebuck h i m s e l f . B a s i c a l l y , h i s 
advocacy o f r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e Confederacy was based 
upon t h e r i g h t o f s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . Roebuck 
contended t h a t : 
Now, n o t o n l y d i d t h e American people 
e s t a b l i s h t h e i r independence, but t h e y a l s o 
e s t a b l i s h e d two p o i n t s o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, 
which I t h i n k o f v e r y g r e a t importance at the 
p r e s e n t t i m e . The f i r s t was, t h a t any body 
of people, d e t e r m i n i n g t o throw o f f t h e i r 
22 Guedalla, pp.239 - 247 
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a l l e g i a n c e , were j u s t i f i e d , i f t h e y had t h e 
power, i n so d o i n g . 
The Member t h e n a s s e r t e d t h a t t h e "second p o i n t was 
v e r y remarkable" f o r "we a d m i t t e d , when we made peace, 
t h a t France was j u s t i f i e d i n acknowledging them [ t h e 
T h i r t e e n C o l o n i e s ] b e f o r e we o u r s e l v e s d i d so." 
Roebuck, i n r e f e r e n c e t o t h e Confederate States and 
r e c o g n i t i o n , " t h e y had a r i g h t t o c l a i m i t " as the 
c o l o n i e s d i d i n 1776. 
I n e x p l a i n i n g why t h e South seceded. Roebuck 
contended t h a t : 
The N o r t h e r n S t a t e s o f t h e Union r e s o l v e d t o 
make t h e Southern S t a t e s , t h e g r e a t producers 
of t h e c o n t i n e n t , s u b s e r v i e n t t o themselves. 
They e s t a b l i s h e d a t a r i f f which threw t h e 
whole c a r r y i n g power o f t h e c o n t i n e n t i n t o 
t h e i r own hands and compelled t h e Southern 
S t a t e s t o be purchasers o f a l l manufactured 
commodities from t h e N o r t h . 
He f u r t h e r m a i n t a i n e d t h a t t h e South seceded f o r " t h e i r 
o b j e c t b e i n g t o f r e e themselves from t h e t h r a l d o m o f 
t h e N o r t h , and t o a c q u i r e t h e r i g h t s o f f r e e t r a d e . " 
C e c i l , i n b o l s t e r i n g Roebuck's argument, reminded t h e 
House t h a t , i n r e f e r e n c e t o t h e Spanish South American 
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c o l o n i e s , t h e r e was a precedent f o r r e c o g n i t i o n when 
t r o o p s were s t i l l p r e s e n t . 
Roebuck had p r o v i d e d t h e n e u t r a l i s t s w i t h p l e n t y 
o f ammunition w i t h which t o respond. Since h i s two 
p o i n t s o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l law were not u n i v e r s a l l y 
accepted, t h e n e u t r a l i s t s p ressed t h e i r a t t a c k upon 
t h a t p a r t o f h i s argument. Montagu c o m p l e t e l y 
d i s a g r e e d w i t h Roebuck: 
'a g r e a t p o i n t i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law," 
namely, t h a t a s t a t e may throw o f f t h e r u l e 
of i t s C o n s t i t u t i o n a l governors whenever i t 
l i k e s , and may separate from t h e mother s t a t e 
whenever i t can! He proceeded t o say, i n 
l i k e manner, t h a t because t h e French had 
a s s i s t e d i n o b t a i n i n g t h a t independence, 
' t h e r e f o r e a n other g r e a t p r i n c i p l e had been 
e s t a b l i s h e d i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, ' - namely, 
t h a t a l l n a t i o n s have a r i g h t t o do t h e l i k e ! 
Had ever such l o g i c been heard i n t h e House? 
Montagu f u r t h e r q u e s t i o n e d "Should we the n r e a l l y do 
wrong because we had been i n s u l t e d ? " He s a r c a s t i c a l l y 
r e p l i e d , " I f so, we s h o u l d t h e r e b y e s t a b l i s h another 
p o i n t i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law."^^ 
This was t h e l a s t debate on t h e n e u t r a l i t y p o l i c y 
and t h i s t h e l a s t mention o f t h e r i g h t o f s e l f -
23, Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 171, pp. 
1771-1773, 1820. 
24. I b i d , pp.1783-1784. 
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d e t e r m i n a t i o n . I t had proved p o p u l a r w i t h t h e 
i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s as an i s s u e t o a t t a c k n e u t r a l i t y . 
When c o u n t e r i n g t h i s i s s u e d i r e c t l y , t h e n e u t r a l i s t s 
had d i s a g r e e d w i t h i t s a p p l i c a t i o n t o t h e South. 
As a n t i s l a v e r y s e n t i m e n t remained s t r o n g i n Great 
B r i t a i n , s l a v e r y remained an unpopular i n s t i t u t i o n . 
Yet, a n t i s l a v e r y s e n t i m e n t d i d n o t necessary l e a d t o a 
n e u t r a l i s t p o s i t i o n - though i t c l e a r l y d i d i n t h e case 
of t h e R a d i c a l s B r i g h t and F o r s t e r - because of t h e 
ease o f a r g u i n g t h a t t h e war was not one fo u g h t f o r 
em a n c i p a t i o n and because o f t h e c o u n t e r v a i l i n g 
commitment t o s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . Thus, even a f t e r t h e 
issuance o f t h e Emancipation P r o c l a m a t i o n , s l a v e r y 
remained a c o n t e n t i o u s t o p i c and t h e r i g h t o f s e l f -
d e t e r m i n a t i o n c o n t i n u e d as a common i s s u e o f t h e 
i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s . 
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V. R e a l p o l i t i k : 
The Fear of War and the Fear of France 
"They who i n q u a r r e l s i n t e r p o s e , 
w i l l o f t e n get a bloody nose" 
Palmerston t o R u s s e l l , December 30, 1860^ 
W i t h each new problem i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y , 
Palmerston r e l i e d on t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f realpolitik 
sought t o a c t i n what was B r i t a i n ' s b e s t i n t e r e s t and 
expected t h a t o t h e r l e a d e r s would a c t i n t h e i n t e r e s t 
o f t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e n a t i o n s . 2 Thus when t h e Members of 
P a r l i a m e n t were f a c e d w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n o f whether t o 
i n t e r v e n e i n t h e American C i v i l War, some, l i k e t h e i r 
Prime M i n i s t e r , were guid e d by t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f 
realpolitik. 
The B r i t i s h had t o c o n s i d e r t h e i r p o l i c y towards 
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i n terms o f a g l o b a l p e r s p e c t i v e . 
W i t h i n t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s was not o f 
e s p e c i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e . Since t h e l o s s o f t h e c o l o n i e s 
i n 1783, B r i t a i n had ceased t o have a g r e a t i n t e r e s t i n 
N o r t h America r e l a t i v e t o t h e o t h e r areas; even A f r i c a 
and I n d i a r e c e i v e d more a t t e n t i o n t h a n N o r t h America. 
The r e g i o n which a t t r a c t e d t h e most a t t e n t i o n , due t o 
1. This comment was made co n c e r n i n g t h e p r o b a b l e 
e f f e c t s o f B r i t i s h i n t e r v e n t i o n i n America. Herb e r t 
B e l l , L o r d Palmerston, (London: Longman, Green, and 
Company, 1936), p.275. 
2. Kenneth Bourne, The Foreign Policy of Victorian 
England, 1830 - 1902 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 
p.86. 
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concerns about B r i t i s h n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y , was t h e 
European c o n t i n e n t , e s p e c i a l l y France. 
The European c o n t i n e n t was a tense arena d u r i n g 
t h e t i m e when t h e n e u t r a l i t y p o l i c y was b e i n g debated. 
The balance o f power among t h e European n a t i o n s 
c o n t i n u e d t o be m a i n t a i n e d i n or d e r t o p r e v e n t t h e 
d o m i n a t i o n o f a s i n g l e s t a t e . I t a l y was s t i l l 
s t r u g g l i n g t o become a n a t i o n and b o t h Palmerston and 
R u s s e l l c o n t i n u e d t o p r o v i d e lukewarm support s i n c e a 
u n i t e d I t a l y was c o n s i d e r e d t o be an e f f e c t i v e check 
a g a i n s t French expamsion. However, a t I t a l y ' s expense 
and a g a i n s t Palmerston's wishes, France was v y i n g f o r 
an i n c r e a s e i n i n f l u e n c e w h i l e A u s t r i a was a t t e m p t i n g 
t o h o l d on t o her t e r r i t o r y b o r d e r i n g t h e 
M e d i t t e r a n e a n . Furthermore, Palmerston d e s i r e d t h a t 
A u s t r i a remain s t r o n g t o check t h e power of P r u s s i a 
w h i l e he wanted P r u s s i a t o check t h e i n f l u e n c e of 
Russia and France. As he had w r i t t e n t o Lord G r a n v i l l e 
on January 30, 1859: " I am v e r y A u s t r i a n n o r t h of t h e 
A l p s , b u t v e r y a n t i - A u s t r i a n south o f t h e A l p s . 
As t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f t h e European c o n t i n e n t 
were o f paramount importance t o B r i t a i n , i n t h e 
p a r l i a m e n t a r y debates on t h e n e u t r a l i t y p o l i c y one o f 
t h e main arguments used by t h e n e u t r a l i s t s was t h e 
danger o f t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f war w i t h t h e U n i t e d 
S t a t e s , a n a t i o n o f l e s s s t r a t e g i c importance t o 
3. Edmund F i t z m a u r i c e , The Life of Granville George 
Leveson Gower Second Earl Granville, Volume 1 (London: 
Longmans, Green, and Company, 1905), p.325. Palmerston 
appeared t o h o l d t o t h a t view t h r o u g h o u t h i s l a s t 
m i n i s t r y . 
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B r i t a i n than the Great Powers of Europe. The 
n e u t r a l i s t s a s s e r t e d that any form of i n t e r v e n t i o n -
whether mediation, recognition, or f o r c i b l e 
i n t e r v e n t i o n - would r i s k the p o s s i b i l i t y of an Anglo-
American war which would have h o r r i f i c r a m i f i c a t i o n s 
f o r B r i t a i n . In countering the n e u t r a l i s t s , the 
i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s claimed that war would not follow 
i n t e r v e n t i o n , i n par t due to the a s s i s t a n c e of France. 
In March of 1862, the Southern sympathisers moved 
that B r i t a i n should o f f e r to mediate between the North 
and the South. Taylor, F o r s t e r , and Palmerston a l l 
a s s e r t e d that war was a l i k e l y outcome of i n t e r v e n t i o n . 
Taylor p e r c e p t i v e l y noted that the "Amendment they were 
now d i s c u s s i n g had been once or twice changed, and each 
time i t was more d i l u t e d than before" for he understood 
t h a t " I n t e r v e n t i o n was only a longer word for war." 
F o r s t e r announced that the present Motion would "so f a r 
from s t a y i n g the war, would rat h e r aggravate and 
prolong i t , and, p o s s i b l y would drag us into i t . " The 
member pointedly i n q u i r e d whether the motion c a l l e d for 
" f r i e n d l y mediation or f o r c i b l e i n t e r v e n t i o n ? " F o r s t e r 
b e l i e v e d that the i n t e r v e n t i o n would r e s u l t i n a war 
with the United States which would be "wicked and 
u n j u s t " and " f o o l i s h to the grea t e s t p o s s i b l e degree." 
Palmerston a s s e r t e d that "Acknowledgement would not 
e s t a b l i s h a nation unless i t were followed by some 
d i r e c t a c t i v e i n t e r f e r e n c e " and "any attempt to put an 
end to i t by a c t i v e i n t e r f e r e n c e would only produce 
gr e a t e r e v i l s , g r e a t e r s u f f e r i n g s , and greater 
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p r i v a t i o n s t o those on whose b e h a l f i n t e r f e r e n c e had 
been a t t e m p t e d . " ^ 
S i m i l a r l y , on June 30, 1863, t h r e e Members o f 
P a r l i a m e n t o b j e c t e d t o Roebuck's motion on grounds t h a t 
war was t o be t h e r e s u l t o f i n t e r v e n t i o n . L ord Montagu 
m a i n t a i n e d t h a t " t he R e s o l u t i o n o f t h e hon. Member f o r 
S h e f f i e l d amounted, t h e r e f o r e , t o a d e s i r e f o r an 
a l l i a n c e t o go t o war w i t h t h e N o r t h . " To those who 
b e l i e v e d t h a t B r i t a i n c o u l d r e c o g n i s e and remain 
n e u t r a l , Montagu c o u n t e r e d t h a t these "two t h i n g s were 
i n c o m p a t i b l e . " F o r s t e r adamantly b e l i e v e d t h a t an 
" A l l i a n c e w i t h France f o r t h e purposes of i n t e r v e n t i o n 
was apt t o l e a d t o war," w h i l e " i n t e r v e n t i o n would 
d e s t r o y t h e hopes o f t h e peace p a r t y . " B r i g h t 
c o n s i d e r e d t h e r e a l purpose o f t h e motion t o be q u i t e 
c l e a r , f o r "taken i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h h i s c h a r a c t e r and 
w i t h t h e speech he has made t o - n i g h t , and w i t h t h e 
speech he has r e c e n t l y made elsewhere on t h i s s u b j e c t , 
I may say t h a t he would have come t o about t h e same 
c o n c l u s i o n i f he had proposed t o address t h e Crown 
i n v i t i n g t h e Queen t o d e c l a r e war a g a i n s t t h e U n i t e d 
S t a t e s o f America."^ 
Even some Southern sympathisers p u b l i c l y s t a t e d 
t h e f e a r t h a t i n t e r v e n t i o n c o u l d l e a d t o war. I n 
response t o Roebuck's mot i o n , C l i f f o r d confessed t h a t 
he " s h o u l d g i v e h i s c o r d i a l support t o t h e Amendment, 
^. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 168, pp.524, 
534-535, 572. 
^. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 171, 
pp.1788-1789, 1814, 1825. 
90 
f o r he t h o u g h t t h a t i f any p r e c i p i t a t e a c t plunged t h i s 
c o u n t r y i n t o h o s t i l i t i e s w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , a new 
f e a t u r e o f h o r r o r would be added t o those now w i t n e s s e d 
i n America." On t h e same oc c a s i o n , Gladstone contended 
t h a t " i t i s v e r y d i f f i c u l t as f a r as I know t o f i n d 
cases where t h e r e has been r e c o g n i t i o n pending t h e 
c o n t e s t , and where t h a t r e c o g n i t i o n has not been 
f o l l o w e d by war." He a d v i s e d t h a t r e c o g n i t i o n must 
o n l y come i f t h e war was " v i r t u a l l y a t an end." 
Gladstone m a i n t a i n e d t h a t "as l o n g as doubt e x i s t s , 
t h a t doubt ought t o be r u l e d on t h e s i d e o f s a f e t y . " ^ 
E a r l i e r , i n t h e autumn of 1862, Gladstone had 
a t t e m p t e d t o persuade t h e Cabinet t h a t t h e t i m e had 
come f o r B r i t a i n t o e x t e n d an o f f e r o f m e d i a t i o n t o t h e 
N o r t h and t h e South. When Lord G r a n v i l l e heard o f 
t h i s , he w r o t e t o R u s s e l l and defended t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n 
o f t h e n e u t r a l i t y p o l i c y on t h e ground t h a t t h e 
a l t e r n a t i v e would l e a d t o war. He b e l i e v e d t h a t 
m e d i a t i o n would f a i l f o r e i t h e r j u s t one or n e i t h e r 
p a r t y would accept t h e p r o p o s a l and t h e n h o s t i l i t i e s 
w i t h B r i t a i n would be i n e v i t a b l e . On September 27, he 
w r o t e : 
I t would not be a good moment t o 
r e c o g n i s e t h e South j u s t b e f o r e a g r e a t 
F e d e r a l success. I f , on t h e o t h e r hand, the 
Confederates c o n t i n u e v i c t o r i o u s , as i t i s t o 
6. I b i d , pp.1797, 1809, 1811 
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be hoped, we s h o u l d s t a n d b e t t e r t h e n t h a n 
now i n r e c o g n i s i n g them. 
I n any case I doubt, i f t h e war 
c o n t i n u e s l o n g a f t e r our r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e 
South, whether i t w i l l be p o s s i b l e f o r us t o 
a v o i d d r i f t i n g i n t o i t . The e x p e c t a t i o n o f 
an immediate s u p p l y o f t h e best c o t t o n w i l l 
have been r a i s e d i n t h i s c o u n t r y . The 
d i s l i k e which now e x i s t s between us w i l l be 
much i n c r e a s e d . The N o r t h w i l l become 
desp e r a t e , and even a g a i n s t t h e i r i n t e n t i o n s 
w i l l g i v e us innumerable casus belli. The 
r e s u l t o f such a war under p r e s e n t 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s i s n o t d o u b t f u l , b u t much 
v a l u a b l e b l o o d would be u n n e c e s s a r i l y s p i l t , 
i n f i n i t e l y more t r e a s u r e would be spent t h a n 
i s s u f f i c i e n t t o m a i n t a i n t h e c o t t o n 
o p e r a t i v e s d u r i n g t h e i r temporary d i s t r e s s ; 
and whether t h e French went w i t h us or n o t , 
i t i s n o t u n l i k e l y t h a t circumstances might 
a r i s e which would enable t h e Emperor more 
f r e e l y t o adopt any f o r e i g n p o l i c y e i t h e r i n 
I t a l y or elsewhere which might s u i t him."^ 
I am a f r a i d your message was not 
i n t e n d e d t o produce such a l o n g r i g m a r o l e , 
b u t you w i l l see by i t t h a t I have come t o 
th e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t i t i s premature t o depart 
. L i k e Palmerston, G r a n v i l l e was c l e a r l y concerned 
w i t h Napoleon's meddling i n I t a l y . 
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from t h e p o l i c y which has h i t h e r t o been 
adopted by you and Lord Palmerston, and 
which, n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e s t r o n g a n t i p a t h y 
t o t h e N o r t h , t h e s t r o n g sympathy w i t h t h e 
South, and t h e p a s s i o n a t e wish t o have 
c o t t o n , has met w i t h such g e n e r a l a p p r o v a l 
from P a r l i a m e n t , t h e p r e s s , and t h e public.® 
I n a realpolitik framework, one would have t o ask 
what B r i t a i n was t o g a i n i n a war w i t h t h e U n i t e d 
S t a t e s as opposed t o what was t o be l o s t . The 
n e u t r a l i s t s b e l i e v e d t h a t B r i t a i n s t o o d t o l o s e i n 
t h r e e ways: her B r i t i s h N o r t h American c o l o n i e s , her 
merchant s h i p p i n g , and her re s o u r c e s . 
B r i t a i n ' s i n t e r e s t s i n N o r t h America were m a i n l y 
i n v e s t e d i n t h e B r i t i s h N o r t h American c o l o n i e s which 
would l a t e r f orm t h e n a t i o n o f Canada. Her p r i m a r y 
concern f o r t h e c o l o n i s t s l a y i n t h e i r p r o t e c t i o n from 
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . I n b o t h t h e American R e v o l u t i o n and 
d u r i n g t h e War o f 1812, t h e c o l o n i e s had been a prime 
t a r g e t f o r t h e American f o r c e s . Furthermore, i t had 
been no s e c r e t t h a t t h e Americans had o f t e n c o n s i d e r e d 
t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f annexing t h e c o l o n i e s i n t o t h e 
expanding young n a t i o n . 
From a m i l i t a r y p e r s p e c t i v e , t h e B r i t i s h N o r t h 
American c o l o n i e s were e s p e c i a l l y v u l n e r a b l e d u r i n g t h e 
c i v i l war. The p o s s i b i l i t y o f American success was 
g r e a t e r s i n c e t h e r e were n e a r l y 2.1 m i l l i o n men i n t h e 
®. F i t z m a u r i c e , pp.443-444. 
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United States Army during the war whereas the Canadian 
border guards numbered around 10,000. During the Trent 
c r i s i s , Palmerston's concern f o r Canada's defence was 
v i v i d l y displayed when he sent 5,000 regular troops. 
The defensive c a p a b i l i t y of these guards was f u r t h e r 
diminished since they were scattered a l l along the 
Canadian-American border. A d d i t i o n a l l y , due t o the 
poor annual weather of the winter months, the B r i t i s h 
could not hope t o supply the Canadian forces throughout 
the e n t i r e year.^ 
The danger t o the colonies was c l e a r l y understood 
by Palmerston. I n the autumn of 1862, I n considering 
the r a m i f i c a t i o n s of i n t e r v e n t i o n he wrote i n p r i v a t e : 
As regards possible resentment on the part of 
the Northerns f o l l o w i n g upon our 
acknowledgement of the independence of the 
South, i t i s q u i t e t r u e t h a t we should have 
less t o care about t h a t resentment i n the 
spri n g when communication w i t h Canada opens, 
and when our naval force could more e a s i l y 
operate upon the American coast than i n 
win t e r , when we are cut o f f from Canada and 
the American coast i s not so safe.^^ 
^. James McPherson, The Battle Cry of Freedom (Oxford: 
Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1988), p. 306; Norman F e r r i s , 
The Trent Affair, p. 65. 
G.P. Gooch, The Later Correspondence of Lord John 
Russell 1840 - 1878, (London: Longmans, Green and 
Company, 1925), p.326. 
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These concerns were also discussed i n the p u b l i c forum 
of Parliament. On June 30, 1863, Lord Montagu stated 
"Besides, we had t o take i n t o account t h a t the North i s 
now a great m i l i t a r y power, while we had but few 
troops, widely s c a t t e r e d over Canada, and an easy prey 
t o an invader. The capture by the North of our 
s c a t t e r e d garrisons there would make us look rather 
small i n the eyes of the world."^^ 
The i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s attempted t o counter the 
n e u t r a l i s t ' s claim t h a t Canada's defence should guide 
B r i t i s h p o l i c y . I n the June 30 debate. Lord Robert 
C e c i l advocated support f o r Roebuck's motion and argued 
against the fear of war by c r i t i c i s i n g those who had 
mentioned the questionable state of Canadian defense. 
He asserted t h a t he " d i d not imagine t h a t our 
possession i n Canada i n f l u e n c e d our judgement one way 
or another."^2 This was not a popular strategy though, 
and C e c i l was the only member t o advocate no 
consideration of Canadian defence. 
B r i t a i n ' s merchant shipping was also i n danger 
durin g a war w i t h the United States. B r i t a i n ' s navy 
was unquestionably too powerful f o r the Americans t o 
challenge on the high seas. However, B r i t a i n ' s 
merchant marine was vulnerable t o American p r i v a t e e r s . 
As the United States had not signed the 1856 
Declaration of Paris, i t had l e f t open the option of 
i s s u i n g l e t t e r s of marque. The B r i t i s h d i d not have t o 
Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 171, 
p.1794. 
I b i d , p.1820. 
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consider the past wars t o appreciate the danger of 
p r i v a t e e r s , they had only t o look at the Confederacy's 
successes w i t h p r i v a t e e r s . The Alabama and the 
Florida, t o name but two, had a devastating e f f e c t from 
March 1862 u n t i l 1864 upon the United States merchant 
marine. Yet the o v e r a l l e f f e c t of the Confederate 
p r i v a t e e r s was due t o only a few ships. There was no 
question t h a t the United States could produce more 
p r i v a t e e r s than the Confederates and t h e r e f o r e could 
also cause more damage. 
Lord Montagu, on June 30, 1863, discussed t h i s 
p o i n t by a s s e r t i n g t h a t i f war would occur between the 
United States and B r i t a i n : 
Our commerce would also c e r t a i n l y have 
something t o fear from the Alabamas and the 
F l o r i d a s which the North could put upon the 
seas. He was not appealing t o the fears of 
the Englishmen, but was simply p o i n t i n g out 
some of the consequences t h a t would 
i n e v i t a b l y f o l l o w our i n t e r v e n t i o n i n t h i s 
contest. 
B r i g h t also discussed the danger t o commerce i n t h i s 
same debate: 
I have not said a word w i t h regard t o what 
may happen t o England i f we go i n t o war w i t h 
13. I b i d , p.1794. 
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the United States. I t w i l l be a war on the 
ocean - every ship t h a t belongs t o the two 
nations w i l l , as f a r as possible, be swept 
from the seas."'-* 
The other f e a r of war l a y i n the loss of l i f e and 
resources. The B r i t i s h had only t o observe the vast 
cost t h a t the North and South were paying t o conduct 
the c o n f l i c t and t o r e c a l l the immense cost of previous 
c o n f l i c t s i n order t o appreciate the f i n a n c i a l burden 
of war. On June 30, from an f i n a n c i a l standpoint, 
F o r s t e r " d i d not b e l i e v e t h a t the sympathies of any 
class of the people i n t h i s country went so f a r as t o 
submit t o an a d d i t i o n a l income tax f o r the purpose of 
defending Canada."^^ 
The loss of l i f e , though, was the most feared 
aspect of a war w i t h the United States. While the past 
two wars w i t h the United States had r e s u l t e d i n 
r e l a t i v e l y low c a s u a l t i e s , the b a t t l e s of the American 
C i v i l War were r e s u l t i n g i n casualties beyond any 
previous expectations or previous c o n f l i c t s . The 
B r i t i s h had t o take i n t o consideration t h a t they would 
have t o expect t o s u f f e r c asualties of the p r o p o r t i o n 
t h a t the North and South were s u f f e r i n g i f a war 
occurred between B r i t a i n and the United States. 
I n March of 1862, Taylor used t h i s aspect of the 
fear of war t o b o l s t e r h i s argument: 
I b i d , p.1837. 
I b i d , p.1813. 
97 
War without bloodshed and s u f f e r i n g was 
impossible; but why must we run i n t o i t ? Did 
experience teach us no lessons? There was 
the war w i t h Russia, and who would say t h a t 
game was worth the l i g h t i t cost? There was 
the i n t e r v e n t i o n i n Mexico, the only good 
step which was when we stepped out of i t . 
There was immediate danger of war w i t h China. 
Yet a l l these wars would be p e t t y and 
i n s i g n i f i c a n t as compared w i t h a war between 
us and the United States of America. No war 
i n the century would be a p a r a l l e l f o r such a 
t e r r i b l e c o n f l i c t . I t would be a f r a t r i c i d a l 
war, almost as t h a t which was being fought 
between the South and the North - a war which 
would s t r i k e t e r r o r i n t o a l l the f r i e n d s of 
progress and l i b e r t y , and be r e j o i c e d at by 
a l l who were t h e i r foes.^^ 
Lord Montagu, i n 1863 asserted t h a t of a l l the 
menaces of war, the loss of l i f e was the greatest t o be 
feared. He f i r s t opened h i s discussion w i t h the 
question "how was an ar m i s t i c e t o be enforced?" and 
f u r t h e r asked "Did the hon. Member mean t o say t h a t 
they should have a war at once t o carry t h a t armistice 
i n t o e f f e c t ? " He answered t h i s question w i t h a 
1^. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 168, p.524. 
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comprehensive consideration of the r a m i f i c a t i o n s of war 
w i t h the United States: 
I f we recognised the South, the North would 
i n f a l l i b l y declare war upon us, our own blood 
would then be shed i n a d d i t i o n t o t h a t of the 
South, and also of the many r e c r u i t s who had 
l e f t t h i s country f o r the North. But i f the 
hon. and learned Member meant war, then l e t 
war be d e l i b e r a t e l y declared, l e t them not 
profess t o recognize merely, l e t them not 
deceive the people of the United States and 
our own nat i o n also, by copious professions 
of amity and f r i e n d s h i p . Why should the hon. 
and learned Member not say what he r e a l l y 
meant? Because he knew t h a t war would be 
unpopular, because he and a l l the world were 
aware t h a t war meant heavy burdens and 
onerous taxes. The hon. and learned Member 
would, indeed, do w e l l t o beware of war; not 
because we should have t o operate at a 
distance of 3,000 miles; not because our 
shipping i n every nook and corner of the 
world would have t o be protected from 
American p r i v a t e e r s ; nor yet because the 
Guards, so sparsely scattered over Canada, 
would be taken p r i s o n e r s ; but because i n such 
99 
a war we should be arrayed against our own 
f l e s h and blood. ^ '^  
I n 1863, Forster also argued t h i s p o i n t by asking his 
colleagues "what would England gain by such a war?" i n 
which the "great Anglo-Saxon race would be t o r n . " He 
concluded by s t a t i n g the he "prayed t h a t England might 
be saved from such an u n j u s t , barbarous, and un-
c h r i s t i a n war, waged, as i t would be, against the 
s p i r i t of c i v i l i z a t i o n , and against every p r i n c i p l e of 
r e l i g i o n and morality.""^" 
Another way, although not an e s p e c i a l l y popular 
one, by which the i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s countered the fear 
of war was t o suggest t h a t B r i t a i n ' s m i l i t a r y power 
could e a s i l y defeat the United States. The argument 
contended t h a t B r i t a i n , as a world power, could e a s i l y 
overcome the United States which was not considered a 
m i l i t a r y power of equal p r o p o r t i o n t o the nations of 
Europe. 
J.A. Roebuck used t h i s l i n e of argument t o 
c o n t r a d i c t those who b e l i e v e d t h a t the fear of war 
j u s t i f i e d a n e u t r a l stance towards the c i v i l war. His 
argument r e l i e d on the immense power of the Royal Navy 
which was unquestionably the most powerful navy i n the 
world. Her p r e s t i g e had f u r t h e r grown w i t h the 
i n c l u s i o n of the new ironclads Pi^arrior and the Biac^ 
Prince. These ships, which brought together several 
^'^. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 171, 
p.1786. 
I b i d , pp.1817-1818. 
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r e v o l u t i o n a r y ideas, were the p r i d e and the new 
backbone of the Royal Navy.^^ 
On June 30, 1863, i n concluding h i s speech. 
Roebuck challenged the b e l i e f i n the fear of war by 
a s s e r t i n g t h a t : 
With t h i s before them, are they not prepared 
t o act i n concert w i t h France? Are they 
a f r a i d of war? War w i t h whom? With the 
Northern States of America? Why, i n ten 
days. S i r , we should sweep from the sea every 
ship. [Oh, oh!] Yes, there are people so 
imbued w i t h Northern f e e l i n g as t o be 
indignant at the a s s e r t i o n . But the t r u t h i s 
known. Why, the IVarrior would destroy t h e i r 
whole f l e e t . Their armies are melting away; 
t h e i r invasion i s r o l l e d back; Washington i s 
i n danger.... 
One of the Northern sympathisers countered Roebuck's 
p o i n t . R i d i c u l i n g Roebuck's claims, Forster said t h a t 
he "would hardly l i k e t o see the seas covered w i t h 
Northern Alabamas preying on t h e i r commerce 
notwith s t a n d i n g the boast of the hon. and learned 
Member f o r S h e f f i e l d t h a t one IVarrior would sweep them 
a l l away."21 
1^. Peter P a d f i e l d , The Battleship Era (London: The 
M i l i t a r y Book Society, 1972), pp.23-24. 
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The Southern sympathisers hoped t o increase t h e i r 
support by recommending t h a t B r i t a i n , i n concert w i t h 
other Europeon nations, o f f e r the o f f i c e s of mediation. 
I n t h i s way, they sta t e d t h a t the United States would 
be more w i l l i n g t o accept an ar m i s t i c e i f more than one 
Europeon n a t i o n suggested t h a t course of a c t i o n . 
Secretly though, the Southern sympathisers w e l l knew 
t h a t the o f f e r of mediation would be accepted r e a d i l y 
by the South while the North would d e f i a n t l y refuse on 
the premise t h a t the war was an i n t e r n a l a f f a i r . When 
the North declined the o f f e r of mediation, the 
i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s could then propose recognizing the 
Confederacy, Their chances of succeeding would be f a r 
greater i f the North had refused an o f f e r of mediation. 
The concert of nations t h a t were recommended t o 
make an o f f e r of mediation w i t h B r i t a i n were France and 
Russia. Of these, France was considered f a r more often 
than Russia because the Russian czar - Alexander I I -
was pro-North while Napoleon was pro-South and France 
was s u f f e r i n g from the lack of Southern cotton l i k e 
B r i t a i n . This economic common ground was hoped t o 
increase the chances t h a t the two nations, which d i d 
not t r u s t each other, might be brought together on t h i s 
issue. On July 18, 1862, Lindsay used t h i s p o int t o 
b o l s t e r h i s argument. He noted t h a t due t o the cotton 
shortage B r i t a i n would not have t o act alone i n 
o f f e r i n g mediation f o r the "Emperor of the French, 
whose people were known t o be s u f f e r i n g even more 
severely than ours from the stoppage of the cotton 
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supply, would only be too happy i n j o i n i n g England i n 
o f f e r i n g mediation."^^ 
The n e u t r a l i s t s contended t h a t cotton could not be 
obtained by i n t e r v e n t i o n and furthermore the r e s u l t i n g 
war would cost f a r more than the cotton shortage was 
cos t i n g B r i t a i n . On March 10, 1862, W.E.Forster 
dismissed the cotton shortage as a casus belli, for 
B r i t a i n "could keep the working population of 
Lancashire i n luxury f o r less than the p r i c e i t would 
cost us t o i n t e r f e r e as the noble Lord opposite 
suggested."^^ 
S i m i l a r l y , on June 30, 1863, Lord Montagu questioned 
the immediate economic b e n e f i t s of r e c o g n i t i o n : 
but could any man believe t h a t the mere 
r e c o g n i t i o n of the Southern States, without a 
war, b r i n g over a s i n g l e bale of cotton? Or 
t h a t r e c o g n i t i o n w i t h war would lesson the 
hardship, d i m i n i s h the taxes, or stop the 
e f f u s i o n of blood?^^ 
Outside Parliament John B r i g h t s t a t e d t h a t i t would be 
cheaper t o feed the a f f e c t e d workers on champagne and 
venison than t o have B r i t a i n intervene i n the war.^^ 
The most dramatic discussion of an Anglo-French 
i n t e r v e n t i o n occurred on June 30, 1863, when the c i v i l 
Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 168, p.521. 
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war had reached a watershed. During h i s long speech. 
Roebuck declared t h a t "the great Powers of Europe" were 
r e a l l y j u s t France, n o t i n g t h a t "No other Power, w i t h 
the exception of Russia, has a f l e e t t h a t we need t h i n k 
about." He conveyed the French Emperor's personal 
desire t o "ask them [the B r i t i s h ] again whether they 
would be w i l l i n g t o j o i n me i n t h a t r e c o g n i t i o n . " ^ ^ 
Lindsay also described the meeting f o r the 
Commons: 
A l l the Emperor meant, so f a r as I understood 
him, was t h a t i f the House of Commons should 
pray Her Majesty t o address him on the 
subject of the r e c o g n i t i o n of the Southern 
States, he would be only too happy t o enter 
i n t o n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h t h a t object, 
b e l i e v i n g , as he d i d , t h a t i f the great 
Powers of Europe thought i t advisable t o 
recognize the Southern Confederacy, the moral 
e f f e c t would be such as t o stay the t e r r i b l e 
27 
carnage now going on m America.*' 
When considering the m i s t r u s t t h a t e x i s t e d between 
France and B r i t a i n , one can b e t t e r appreciate the 
c r i t i c i s m t h a t Roebuck received, f o r the French were 
not a l l i e s of the B r i t i s h nor was Napoleon I I I popular 
across the Channel. As Palmerston had stated i n • 
26. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 171, 
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reference t o Napoleon I I I and the French Government " I 
hate the man, I detest the system, but i t i s the only 
t h i n g f o r the present."^^ i n terms of Europe, 
B r i t a i n ' s main concern was France. Napoleon I I I , 
hoping t o f o l l o w i n the footsteps of h i s great Uncle, 
was co n s t a n t l y i n v e s t i n g i n France's m i l i t a r y . As f o r 
B r i t a i n , t h i s took the most th r e a t e n i n g t u r n when he 
decided t o construct several i r o n c l a d s . The B r i t i s h , 
who p r i d e d themselves on t h e i r great navy, were able t o 
more than match him ship f o r ship. Nevertheless, 
Napoleon's attempt t o o u t b u i l d the B r i t i s h was a clear 
sign t h a t he was B r i t a i n ' s main naval challenge and 
perhaps her main adversary. 
Since according t o Roebuck, Napoleon desired t o 
o f f e r mediation, c l e a r l y the French Emperor considered 
the o f f e r i n the best i n t e r e s t of France. As Napoleon 
I I I i n the language of realpolitik once stated, "When 
people ask one ... f o r what i s c a l l e d a p o l i c y the only 
answer i s t h a t we mean t o do what may seem t o be best 
upon each occasion as i t a r i s e s , making the i n t e r e s t s 
of one's country one's guid i n g p r i n c i p l e . " ^ ^ I t was 
not l i k e l y t h a t the Members of Parliament were t o 
consider i n t e r v e n t i o n i n B r i t a i n ' s i n t e r e s t simply 
because Napoleon considered i t i n h i s best i n t e r e s t . 
The deep suspicion of France was c l e a r l y evident 
when several months p r i o r , as the Cabinet was w r e s t l i n g 
28. M u r i e l Chamberlain, British Foreign Policy in the 
Age of Palmerston (London: Longman, Green and Company, 
1980), p.33. 
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w i t h the question of whether t o o f f e r mediation w i t h 
France, Palmerston wrote t o Russell: 
As t o the French scheme of proposals t o 
the United States, we had b e t t e r keep t h a t 
question t i l l the Cabinet meets, which would 
be e i t h e r Tuesday 11th or Wednesday 12th, as 
would be most convenient t o you and my 
colleagues. But i t i s l i k e l y t h a t the 
Federals would consent t o an assistance t o be 
accompanied by a cessation of blockades, and 
which would give the Confederates means of 
g e t t i n g a l l the supplies they may want? The 
blockade might indeed be continued against 
contraband of war, ad m i t t i n g commerce t o go 
i n and out; but i f the Southerns could send 
any lar g e q u a n t i t y of cotton t o Europe they 
would c o n t r i v e somehow or other t o get the 
value back i n muskets and war l i k e stores. 
Then comes the d i f f i c u l t y about slavery and 
the g i v i n g up of runaway slaves, about which 
we could h a r d l y frame a proposal which the 
Southerns would accept, the Northerns agree 
t o , and the people of England would approve 
of. The French Government are more free from 
the shackles of p r i n c i p l e s and of r i g h t and 
wrong on these matters, as on a l l others, 
than we are. At a l l events i t would be wiser 
t o wait t i l l the e l e c t i o n s i n N. America are 
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over before any proposal i s made. As the 
Emperor i s so anxious t o put a stop t o 
bloodshed, he might t r y h i s hand as a 
beginning by p u t t i n g down the stream of 
r u f f i a n s which r o l l s out from t h a t never 
f a i l i n g f o u n t a i n at Rome."^ ^ 
John B r i g h t , the adamantly pro-American member, 
recognized t h a t Roebuck's mention of the French Emperor 
was c l e a r l y a weak p o i n t which he sought t o e x p l o i t . A 
s u b s t a n t i a l p o r t i o n of h i s speech dealt w i t h the 
Pa r i s i a n escapade. He r e c a l l e d t h a t the Member of 
S h e f f i e l d requested "us t o accept the lead of the 
Emperor of the French on, I w i l l undertake t o say, one 
of the greatest questions t h a t ever was submitted -to 
the B r i t i s h Parliament." However, he r e c a l l e d t h a t 
t h i s same i n d i v i d u a l two years p r i o r had confessed " I 
have no f a i t h i n the Emperor of the French." He 
charged t h a t Roebuck had "become as i t were i n the 
palace of the French Emperor a co-conspirator w i t h him 
to drag t h i s country i n t o a p o l i c y which I maintain i s 
as h o s t i l e t o i t s i n t e r e s t s as i t would be degrading t o 
i t s honour." Lindsay, the Member f o r Sunderland, had 
accompanied Roebuck t o Par i s . B r i g h t noted " I saw the 
Member f o r Sunderland near me, and I noticed t h a t h i s 
face underwent remarkable c o n t o r t i o n s during the speech 
of the hon. and learned Gentleman, and I f e l t p e r f e c t l y 
30. Gooch, p.329. As f i g h t i n g continued i n Rome, 
Palmerston believed t h a t Napoleon could exercise some 
in f l u e n c e i n order t o prevent any f u r t h e r loss of l i f e . 
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s a t i s f i e d t h a t he d i d not agree w i t h what h i s colleague 
was saying."31 
I n terms of realpolitik, the n e u t r a l i s t s had the 
advantage. The m i s t r u s t towards France made any hope 
of gaining support f o r a j o i n t o f f e r of mediation 
d i f f i c u l t . The B r i t i s h simply had no desire t o f o l l o w 
the lead of a man whom they perceived as an adversary. 
As f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y of war w i t h the United States, 
i t was d i f f i c u l t f o r the i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s t o contend 
t h a t war would not f o l l o w or t h a t i f i t d i d , the 
B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y would e a s i l i y overwhelm the American 
forces. The fear of war and the fear of France proved 
t o be persuasive arguments i n advocating the 
co n t i n u a t i o n of n e u t r a l i t y . 
31. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Volume 171, 
pp.1826-1827. 
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Conclusion: The Golden Rule Prevails 
During the debate on Roebuck's motion. Lord 
Montagu had described n e u t r a l i t y as the "golden r u l e " 
i n p o l i t i c s and p r i v a t e l i f e and he claimed t h a t "we 
should observe the golden r u l e . " Indeed, Montagu and a 
m a j o r i t y of h i s f e l l o w members had decided, i n respect 
t o the American C i v i l War, t h a t B r i t a i n should observe 
the golden r u l e and not intervene. 
The question t h a t then follows i s "Why d i d 
Parliament, i n which a m a j o r i t y of the members 
represented the pro-southern upper classes, c o n t i u a l l y 
support n e u t r a l i t y ? " F i r s t of a l l , the support f o r 
i n t e r v e n t i o n i n 18 61 was rat h e r lukewarm since the 
common b e l i e f was t h a t the war would be one marked by 
b r e v i t y i n stead of l o n g e t i v i t y . 
As the war c a r r i e d over i n t o e a r l y 1862, 
perceptions g r a d u a l l y changed and the i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s 
began t o press t h e i r case. However t h e i r main focus, 
the blockade, f a i l e d t o acquire support f o r 
i n t e r v e n t i o n since the l e g a l d e f i n i t i o n was rather 
ambiguous and since the i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s never had the 
f i g u r e s necessary t o prove the blockade i n e f f e c t i v e . 
I n the middle of 1862, the i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s 
broadened the debate w i t h several issues but none of 
them proved persuasive t o the m a j o r i t y . The cotton 
shortage was o f f s e t by the un c e r t a i n t y of p u b l i c 
opinion and the r i g h t of se l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n was 
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countered by the s l a v e r y i s s u e . And f i n a l l y , due to 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of war with the United States and the 
s u s p i c i o n of France, the i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s had great 
d i f f i c u l t y i n proving that i n t e r v e n t i o n was i n the best 
i n t e r e s t of B r i t a i n . Ultimately, the arguments i n 
favour of n e u t r a l i t y were not strong enough to persuade 
most of the pro-Southern Members of Parliament, 
i n c l u d i n g such notable ones as Palmerston and R u s s e l l . 
Even Gladstone, who had adamantly supported 
i n t e r v e n t i o n i n the autumn of 1862, spoke against 
i n t e r v e n t i o n i n 1863 during the debate on Roebuck's 
motion. A majority of the Members of Parliament 
supported n e u t r a l i t y as i t was considered the p o l i c y 
which was best for B r i t a i n . 
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